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ABSTRACT	  MARY	  MORGAN	  GLADNEY:	  	  The	  Trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  Economy	  from	  2001	  to	  the	  present:	  	  What	  comes	  next?	  (Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Gregory	  Love)	  	   	   This	  thesis	  looks	  at	  global	  economic	  factors	  and	  Argentina’s	  internal	  economic	  policy	  and	  political	  conditions	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  to	  determine	  the	  near-­‐term	  future	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  By	  analyzing	  the	  factors	  that	  previously	  influenced	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  Argentina,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  answer	  this	  question:	  	  What	  is	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  in	  the	  current	  political	  climate?	  	  In	  2001	  after	  a	  ten-­‐year	  period	  of	  economic	  policy	  reform,	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  collapsed.	  Over	  a	  decade	  has	  passed	  since	  the	  crash	  of	  2001,	  and	  now	  Argentina	  is	  once	  again	  in	  a	  precarious	  position.	  	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  macroeconomic	  condition	  of	  Argentina.	  	  More	  specifically,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  information	  gathered	  about	  the	  global	  economic	  climate	  and	  internal	  economic	  policy	  to	  draw	  a	  connection	  to	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  growth	  rates,	  and	  unemployment	  rates	  that	  resulted.	  	  I	  will	  also	  analyze	  the	  patterns	  of	  change	  in	  these	  figures	  over	  time.	  	  Then,	  I	  will	  use	  these	  findings	  to	  predict	  how	  these	  rates	  will	  change	  in	  the	  future.	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CHAPTER	  I.	  	  Introduction	  
	  
A.	  Research	  Question:	  	  What	  is	  the	  Trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  Economy?	  	   In	  2001	  after	  a	  ten-­‐year	  period	  of	  economic	  policy	  reform,	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  collapsed.	  	  With	  a	  convertibility	  law	  that	  set	  the	  peso	  equal	  to	  the	  US	  dollar,	  Argentina	  has	  unparalleled	  rigidity	  in	  monetary	  policy	  and	  declining	  influence	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  by	  the	  late	  1990’s.	  	  Over	  a	  decade	  has	  passed	  since	  the	  crash	  of	  2001,	  which	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  economic	  collapse	  of	  an	  IMF-­‐backed	  economy	  up	  to	  that	  point.	  	  Now	  Argentina	  is	  once	  again	  in	  a	  precarious	  position.	  	  The	  exchange	  rate	  is	  unstable,	  and	  unofficial	  black	  dollar	  exchange	  rates	  are	  nearly	  double	  the	  government	  published	  exchange	  rate	  (“Dollar	  Tourists”	  2013).	  	  As	  the	  government	  tries	  to	  pay	  off	  debts,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Argentina	  is	  hoarding	  dollars,	  and	  inflation	  rates	  have	  climbed	  to	  near	  20%	  (“Flying	  Solo”	  2011).	  	  All	  signs	  point	  to	  instability.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  looks	  at	  global	  economic	  factors	  and	  Argentina’s	  internal	  economic	  policy	  and	  political	  conditions	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  to	  determine	  the	  near-­‐term	  future	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  I	  compare	  the	  current	  global	  economy	  to	  that	  of	  the	  late	  90’s	  and	  early	  2000’s	  to	  determine	  congruent	  factors	  and	  generate	  a	  short	  to	  mid-­‐term	  macroeconomic	  prediction.	  	  I	  also	  analyze	  the	  economic	  policy	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  Kirchner	  regime	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  Menem’s	  presidency	  and	  the	  convertibility	  law.	  	  By	  analyzing	  the	  factors	  that	  previously	  influenced	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  Argentina,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  answer	  this	  question:	  	  What	  is	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  in	  the	  current	  political	  climate?	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B.	  A	  century	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economic	  cycle	  Argentina	  has	  long	  experienced	  cycles	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  collapse.	  	  The	  country	  was	  a	  particularly	  successful	  emerging	  economy	  until	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  In	  1946,	  Juan	  Perón	  was	  elected	  president	  by	  an	  urban	  working	  class	  constituency	  that	  benefitted	  from	  his	  clientelist	  politics	  after	  the	  devastating	  depression.	  	  With	  the	  implementation	  of	  social	  spending	  and	  import	  substitution	  industrialization,	  the	  nation’s	  economy	  saw	  little	  post-­‐Depression	  Era	  growth	  under	  Peronist	  rule	  (Auyero	  2001).	  	  Argentina	  has	  a	  wealth	  of	  natural	  resources,	  as	  the	  country	  is	  primed	  for	  agriculture,	  forestry,	  and	  mining,	  with	  abundant	  sources	  of	  petroleum,	  gas,	  and	  uranium.	  	  Additionally,	  it	  was	  an	  early-­‐industrialized	  country	  relative	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  region,	  and	  the	  nation	  had	  significantly	  more	  manufacturing	  than	  most	  of	  South	  America.	  	  Despite	  plentiful	  resources	  and	  industry,	  the	  economy	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  long	  periods	  of	  financial	  crisis	  with	  rare	  bright	  spots.	  	  Perón	  died	  on	  July	  1,	  1974	  while	  serving	  a	  third	  presidential	  term,	  and	  his	  wife	  succeeded	  him	  in	  office.	  	  Her	  administration	  was	  undermined	  by	  economic	  downfall	  as	  inflation	  skyrocketed	  and	  GDP	  contracted.	  	  The	  military	  dictatorship	  that	  superseded	  her	  in	  1976	  prolonged	  a	  great	  economic	  decline	  during	  their	  rule	  until	  1983,	  and	  the	  decline	  continued	  for	  some	  time	  after	  (Kydland	  2013).	  	  The	  corrupt	  policies	  of	  financial	  liberalization	  put	  in	  place	  under	  the	  military	  regime	  discouraged	  growth	  and	  increased	  debt	  immensely.	  	  Over	  400,000	  companies	  went	  bankrupt	  under	  dictatorship	  rule.	  Capital	  flight	  was	  a	  widespread	  response	  to	  economic	  decline,	  and	  it	  partly	  prevented	  economic	  recovery	  until	  1990.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  confidence	  in	  the	  peso	  and	  repair	  the	  economy,	  Domingo	  Cavallo,	  Minister	  of	  the	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Economy,	  established	  the	  Convertibility	  Plan	  in	  1991.	  	  It	  set	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  equal	  to	  the	  US	  dollar	  and	  lasted	  until	  1998.	  	  Economic	  success	  immediately	  followed	  as	  inflation	  rates	  decreased,	  but	  the	  Convertibility	  Plan	  was	  not	  a	  permanent	  fix.	  	  By	  1995,	  the	  economy	  was	  crumbling,	  and	  it	  finally	  collapsed	  in	  2001	  (Mussa	  2002).	  	  A	  detailed	  description	  of	  this	  is	  provided	  in	  Chapter	  4:	  The	  Menem	  Era.	  	  	  
The	  Peronists	  have	  dominated	  Argentine	  politics	  for	  decades.	  	  Carlos	  Menem	  served	  as	  president	  from	  1989	  to	  1999	  during	  part	  of	  the	  crisis	  but	  predating	  the	  peso	  crash	  of	  2001.	  	  After	  a	  brief	  two-­‐year	  interlude,	  the	  Peronists	  retuned	  to	  prominence	  when	  Nestor	  Kirchner	  became	  president	  in	  2003.	  	  He	  served	  until	  2007	  when	  Cristina	  Kirchner,	  Nestor’s	  wife	  and	  fellow	  Peronist,	  took	  office.	  	  She	  has	  served	  as	  president	  since	  then.	  	  Since	  Perón	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1946,	  there	  has	  been	  virtually	  no	  ten-­‐year	  period	  without	  a	  financial	  crisis	  (Auyero	  2001).	  	  This	  is	  observable	  especially	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  	  Since	  defaulting	  on	  $100	  billion	  in	  debt	  in	  2001,	  Argentina	  has	  been	  cut	  off	  from	  international	  capital	  markets	  and	  is	  considered	  a	  risky	  place	  to	  invest	  (“Official	  Statistics”	  2013).	  	  The	  country’s	  population	  is	  resilient,	  having	  withstood	  financial	  crises	  for	  many	  decades,	  but	  once	  again,	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  is	  precarious.	  	  After	  Cristina	  Kirchner’s	  reelection	  in	  2011,	  she	  condemned	  the	  sale	  of	  dollars	  at	  the	  official	  exchange	  rate	  to	  protect	  dwindling	  reserves.	  	  Argentine	  national	  reserves	  have	  slid	  significantly	  as	  they	  have	  been	  used	  to	  pay	  off	  the	  nation’s	  immense	  debt.	  Reserves	  typically	  used	  to	  stabilize	  currency	  fell	  by	  nearly	  $5	  billion	  in	  the	  first	  five	  months	  of	  2013	  and	  are	  predicted	  to	  continue	  falling	  at	  this	  rapid	  rate;	  expectations	  are	  a	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staggering	  $9.7	  billion	  in	  2014.	  	  A	  sudden	  25%	  loss	  in	  savings	  led	  to	  an	  even	  higher	  demand	  for	  black	  market	  dollars	  (“Fistful”	  2013).	  	  Though	  the	  official	  Argentine	  conversion	  rate	  has	  been	  maintained	  at	  about	  5	  Argentine	  pesos	  to	  1	  US	  dollar	  for	  the	  last	  several	  years,	  the	  unofficial	  blue	  dollar	  rate	  at	  which	  many	  Argentines	  buy	  and	  sell	  dollars	  jumped	  to	  10.45	  in	  May	  2013.	  	  These	  shocking	  trends	  do	  not	  seem	  as	  if	  they	  will	  slow	  significantly	  or	  stop	  any	  time	  soon.	  	  (“Fistful”	  2013)	  	  Figure	  1	  shown	  below	  portrays	  the	  actual	  exchange	  rate	  versus	  the	  black	  market	  exchange	  rate.	  	  “Dólar	  oficial,”	  the	  green	  line,	  represents	  the	  official	  exchange	  rate	  over	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half	  beginning	  in	  January	  2011.	  	  The	  blue	  line,	  “Dólar	  informal,”	  represents	  the	  black	  market	  exchange	  rate	  over	  the	  same	  time	  period.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Actual	  versus	  Official	  Exchange	  Rate	  (2010-­‐2)	  (Durden	  2013)	  
Turmoil	  surrounding	  the	  exchange	  rate	  is	  nothing	  new	  to	  Argentina.	  	  Many	  current	  issues	  go	  back	  to	  the	  largest	  economic	  crisis	  the	  country	  has	  ever	  faced.	  	  The	  peso	  crisis	  of	  Argentina	  culminated	  in	  2001	  when	  its	  economy	  collapsed.	  	  The	  Convertibility	  Law	  (1991),	  championed	  by	  President	  Carlos	  Menem	  and	  his	  Minister	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of	  the	  Economy	  Domingo	  Cavallo,	  set	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  equal	  to	  the	  US	  dollar.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  exchange	  rate	  was	  fixed	  at	  one	  to	  one	  for	  eight	  years.	  	  Dollars	  and	  pesos	  were	  virtually	  interchangeable,	  and	  both	  could	  be	  withdrawn	  from	  ATMs	  across	  Argentina.	  	  Citizens	  were	  encouraged	  to	  convert	  all	  their	  dollars	  to	  pesos	  since	  the	  two	  were	  now	  equivalent.	  	  Although	  four	  years	  of	  growth	  followed	  the	  1991	  mandate,	  the	  law	  caused	  a	  problem	  unforeseen	  by	  the	  IMF,	  the	  dollarization	  of	  Argentina	  (Truman	  2002).	  	  Argentina’s	  economy	  was	  ill	  equipped	  to	  rise	  to	  the	  US	  dollar’s	  value	  and	  purchasing	  power.	  	  When	  the	  rising	  value	  of	  Argentine	  exports	  caused	  by	  a	  global	  increase	  in	  commodity	  prices	  limited	  the	  buying	  power	  of	  many	  trade	  partners,	  the	  economy	  suffered	  a	  sudden	  stall	  in	  growth	  and	  eventually	  stagnated	  (Quiroga	  2006).	  
	  The	  peso’s	  monetary	  value	  was	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  the	  US	  dollar,	  but	  its	  intrinsic	  value	  was	  not.	  	  This	  means	  that	  Argentine	  currency	  was	  not	  as	  valuable	  as	  the	  US	  dollar,	  but	  the	  global	  currency	  market	  did	  not	  reflect	  this.	  	  The	  over-­‐valued	  peso	  had	  another	  effect	  on	  Argentine	  terms	  of	  trade	  in	  that	  it	  made	  imports	  and	  debt	  cheaper.	  	  Since	  the	  peso	  was	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  dollar,	  markets	  assumed	  the	  riskiness	  of	  the	  peso	  was	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  the	  US	  dollar.	  	  This	  led	  to	  massive	  public	  and	  private	  debt	  on	  imports	  when	  other	  nations	  exported	  goods	  to	  Argentina	  on	  loan	  that	  Argentines	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  when	  the	  economy	  started	  to	  decline.	  	  When	  the	  Convertibility	  Law	  was	  reversed,	  Argentines	  were	  expected	  to	  continue	  paying	  the	  same	  dollar	  price	  for	  goods	  even	  though	  their	  currency	  was	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  collapsing.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  import	  debts	  soared,	  and	  an	  outright	  crisis	  resulted	  (Pou	  2000).	  The	  economic	  crisis	  caused	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  standard	  of	  living,	  negatively	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affecting	  every	  aspect	  of	  Argentine	  life.	  	  Government	  salaries	  and	  benefits	  underwent	  drastic	  cuts,	  leaving	  many	  citizens	  wanting.	  	  Argentines	  victimized	  by	  government	  spending	  cuts	  withdrew	  savings	  in	  pesos	  and	  exchanged	  them	  for	  US	  dollars	  (Quiroga	  2006).	  	  They	  believed	  the	  peso	  was	  doomed	  to	  be	  worthless.	  Deposits	  originally	  made	  in	  dollars	  could	  now	  only	  be	  withdrawn	  in	  pesos,	  and	  the	  conversion	  rate	  was	  four	  pesos	  to	  one	  USD.	  	  Interest	  rates	  for	  loans	  were	  so	  exorbitant	  that	  obtaining	  a	  loan	  was	  virtually	  out	  of	  the	  question	  (Salazar	  2004).	  	  
During	  the	  era	  of	  the	  Convertibility	  Law,	  profitable	  national	  sectors	  like	  YPF	  (an	  oil	  refinery)	  and	  Aerolíneas	  Argentinas	  (a	  national	  airline)	  were	  privatized,	  which	  provided	  for	  dramatic	  growth	  in	  unemployment	  rates	  with	  national	  rates	  up	  to	  20%.	  	  This	  privatization	  was	  the	  result	  of	  policy	  changes	  during	  Menem’s	  presidency	  when	  Argentina	  implemented	  many	  of	  the	  policy	  recommendations	  that	  would	  be	  labeled	  the	  “Washington	  Consensus,”	  an	  IMF-­‐backed	  plan	  that	  received	  wide	  support	  from	  economists.	  	  Since	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  showed	  support	  of	  Menem’s	  policy	  making	  from	  the	  start,	  Argentine	  authorities	  were	  able	  to	  approach	  the	  IMF	  for	  augmentation	  of	  financial	  support	  in	  January	  2001.	  	  The	  IMF	  subsequently	  loaned	  over	  $22	  billion	  to	  Argentina	  under	  the	  pretense	  of	  rigid	  guidelines	  by	  which	  Argentine	  officials	  must	  abide	  to	  receive	  continuing	  support.	  	  IMF	  officials	  sought	  to	  repair	  the	  convertibility	  regime	  in	  order	  to	  renew	  stability,	  but	  they	  found	  this	  policy	  unsound	  and	  ineffective.	  	  The	  IMF	  abandoned	  this	  course	  of	  action	  in	  December	  2001,	  and	  within	  a	  month,	  “economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  dislocation	  occurred	  simultaneously,	  leading	  to	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  President,	  default	  on	  Argentina’s	  sovereign	  debt,	  and	  the	  abandonment	  of	  convertibility”	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(Salazar	  2004).	  	  Under	  the	  weight	  of	  this	  devastating	  debilitation,	  the	  IMF	  could	  do	  little	  to	  help	  and	  largely	  stood	  by	  as	  the	  crisis	  unraveled.	  	  Thus,	  common	  citizens	  were	  trapped	  by	  high	  prices,	  unemployment,	  and	  limited	  access	  to	  money	  (Salazar	  2004).	  	  These	  trends	  determined	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  and	  their	  influence	  is	  evident	  still	  today.	  	  This	  pattern	  will	  continue	  influence	  the	  macroeconomic	  conditions	  of	  the	  near	  term	  future.	  	  The	  Argentine	  economy	  is	  currently	  the	  fifth	  largest	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  and	  trades	  most	  often	  with	  even	  more	  powerful	  economies,	  like	  the	  US	  and	  Brazil.	  	  Its	  mark	  on	  the	  global	  economy	  is	  significant.	  	  Therefore,	  for	  trading	  partners,	  so	  is	  the	  state	  of	  its	  national	  economy.	  	  With	  a	  large	  population	  and	  a	  dominant	  influence	  on	  South	  America,	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  matters	  to	  many.	  	  The	  2001	  crash	  seemed	  to	  occur	  due	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  decline	  and	  internal	  economic	  policy—the	  convertibility	  between	  the	  US	  dollar	  and	  Argentine	  peso,	  privatization	  fueled	  by	  corruption,	  and	  growing	  debt.	  	  The	  Mundell-­‐Fleming	  model,	  or	  the	  economic	  theory	  of	  the	  unholy	  trinity,	  states	  that	  a	  country	  cannot	  succeed	  with	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	  free	  capital	  flow,	  and	  sovereign	  monetary	  policy.	  	  Under	  this	  premise,	  Argentina	  was	  destined	  for	  failure.	  	  The	  effects	  of	  its	  2001	  crash	  were	  far	  reaching,	  and	  today,	  the	  nation’s	  economy	  still	  rests	  precariously	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  recession.	  	  Policy	  and	  economic	  trends	  from	  2001	  to	  the	  present	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  perhaps	  providing	  insight	  into	  why	  the	  economy	  is	  still	  in	  disrepair.	  	  Knowing	  what	  will	  happen	  next	  in	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  will	  give	  significant	  insight	  in	  to	  the	  economic	  state	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  global	  economy.	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CHAPTER	  II.	  	  Macroeconomic	  Theory:	  	  The	  Political	  Business	  Cycle	  	  
	   Macroeconomic	  theory	  helps	  explain	  why	  the	  boom	  and	  bust	  cycles	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  recently.	  	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy,	  current	  economic	  policy	  and	  the	  macroeconomic	  theory	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based	  is	  crucial.	  	  There	  are	  a	  few	  theories	  that	  will	  be	  of	  importance	  to	  this	  study.	  	  First	  is	  the	  political	  business	  cycle	  theory.	  Dr.	  Paul	  M.	  Johnson	  defines	  a	  political	  business	  cycle	  as:	  “A	  business	  cycle	  that	  results	  primarily	  from	  the	  manipulation	  of	  policy	  tools	  (fiscal	  policy,	  monetary	  policy)	  by	  incumbent	  politicians	  hoping	  to	  stimulate	  the	  economy	  just	  prior	  to	  an	  election	  and	  thereby	  greatly	  improve	  their	  own	  and	  their	  party's	  reelection	  chances.	  Expansionary	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  policies	  have	  politically	  popular	  consequences	  in	  the	  short	  run	  (tax	  cuts,	  falling	  unemployment,	  falling	  interest	  rates,	  new	  government	  spending	  on	  services	  for	  special	  interests,	  etc.)”	  	  (Johnson	  1994).	  William	  Nordhaus	  first	  published	  the	  concept	  of	  PBC	  theory	  in	  1971	  as	  a	  single	  chapter	  in	  a	  compilation	  entitled	  Readings	  in	  the	  Theory	  of	  	  
Growth:	  	  A	  Selection	  of	  Papers	  from	  the	  'Review	  of	  Economic	  Studies.'	  	  This	  chapter	  helps	  to	  outline	  a	  novel	  explanation	  of	  economic	  growth	  (or	  lack	  thereof).	  	  The	  detailed	  description,	  accompanied	  by	  empirical	  evidence,	  explains	  exactly	  how	  politicians	  use	  the	  political	  business	  cycle.	  	  Also,	  Nordhaus	  explains	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  of	  policies	  enacted	  under	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  political	  business	  cycle.	  	  The	  general	  premise	  is	  that	  democratic	  politicians	  undervalue	  future	  consumption.	  	  Though	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  individuals	  within	  a	  democracy	  are	  able	  to	  focus	  on	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long-­‐term	  investments	  and	  future	  payoff,	  politicians	  rarely	  do	  the	  same.	  	  Instead,	  they	  spend	  conservatively	  towards	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  term	  and	  abandon	  austerity	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  a	  term	  when	  running	  for	  reelection.	  Actions	  that	  coincide	  with	  PBC	  theory	  include	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  to	  generate	  jobs	  and	  lower	  unemployment,	  spending	  on	  social	  interests,	  and	  cutting	  taxes.	  	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  interest	  rates	  and	  unemployment	  almost	  always	  fall,	  but	  the	  theory	  predicts	  recession	  in	  the	  long	  term	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  	  Nordhaus’s	  work	  provides	  great	  insight	  into	  how	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  Menem	  and	  Kirchner	  regimes	  affected	  the	  Argentine	  economy.	  	  “Flying	  Solo:	  Argentina’s	  Presidential	  Election,”	  published	  in	  
The	  Economist	  shortly	  before	  Cristina	  Kirchner’s	  reelection	  to	  the	  presidency	  in	  October	  2011,	  describes	  the	  nature	  and	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  primary	  elections.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  article	  speaks	  to	  her	  likelihood	  of	  winning	  office	  based	  on	  economic	  success.	  	  Without	  mentioning	  PBC	  theory,	  the	  article	  outlines	  just	  how	  Kirchner	  is	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  political	  business	  cycle	  to	  appease	  voters.	  	  It	  mentions	  her	  refusal	  to	  make	  spending	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases.	  	  It	  even	  mentions	  the	  fictionalized	  inflation	  rates	  published	  by	  the	  government	  as	  they	  continue	  to	  flood	  the	  market	  with	  pesos	  (“Flying	  Solo”	  2011).	  	  The	  economic	  analysis	  provided	  demonstrates	  the	  immediate	  future	  for	  Argentina,	  easily	  predicting	  correctly	  what	  has	  occurred	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  	  Though	  the	  Kirchners’	  constituency	  may	  not	  recognize	  the	  cyclical	  pattern	  created	  by	  PBC	  politics,	  the	  economic	  events	  of	  the	  Kirchner	  regime	  indicate	  that	  the	  political	  business	  cycle	  could	  be	  occurring.	  When	  tactics	  like	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  to	  generate	  jobs	  and	  temporary	  cash	  flows	  are	  used	  before	  elections,	  recessions	  often	  follow	  (Nordhaus	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1971).	  	  	  If	  pursued	  to	  excess,	  this	  sort	  of	  policy	  can	  have	  unfortunate	  long-­‐term	  consequences.	  	  Flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  will	  most	  likely	  devalue	  the	  peso	  and	  create	  inflation.	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  economy	  can	  also	  experience	  a	  low	  rate	  of	  savings,	  damage	  to	  the	  trade	  balance,	  and	  job	  loss.	  	  Below	  is	  a	  chart	  of	  Argentine	  government	  spending	  surrounding	  the	  reelection	  of	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  in	  2011.	  	  Figure	  2,	  seen	  below,	  demonstrates	  that	  spending	  increased	  prior	  to	  her	  reelection	  and	  subsequently	  decreased	  after	  the	  election.	  	  This	  plainly	  follows	  PBC	  theory.	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  2.	  Government	  Budget	  (2010-­‐2)	  (TradingEconomics)	  	  After	  elections,	  newly	  elected	  (or	  reelected)	  officials	  typically	  turn	  these	  policies	  around	  by	  tax	  increases,	  spending	  cuts,	  etc.	  	  Often	  this	  results	  in	  a	  boom	  and	  bust	  cycle	  that	  comes	  around	  every	  election	  time	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  how	  things	  went	  for	  Argentina	  under	  the	  Kirchners	  though.	  	  Instead,	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  maintained	  use	  of	  PBC	  tools	  to	  create	  an	  artificial	  boom.	  	  Another	  April	  2011	  article	  from	  The	  Economist,	  "Lies	  and	  Argentine	  Statistics:	  Stalinist	  Practices	  in	  Buenos	  Aires,"	  describes	  just	  how	  rampant	  corruption	  runs	  in	  Argentina.	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Written	  just	  prior	  to	  Kirchner’s	  reelection	  in	  2011,	  the	  article	  mentions	  how	  inflation	  rates	  published	  by	  the	  government	  have	  been	  doctored	  for	  years	  (“Lies	  and	  Statistics”	  2011).	  	  Below,	  Figure	  3	  shows	  inflation	  rates	  published	  by	  the	  government	  over	  the	  last	  several	  years.	  	  Private	  researchers	  estimate	  actual	  inflation	  rates	  are	  about	  double	  this	  amount.	  	  	  
	  	   	   	  Figure	  3.	  Inflation	  Rate	  (2012-­‐3)	  (Trading	  Economics)	  After	  Kirchner	  used	  fiscal	  policy	  to	  maintain	  an	  artificial	  boom,	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  reacted	  as	  PBC	  theory	  would	  predict,	  with	  excessive	  inflation	  and	  higher	  unemployment	  rates	  that	  are	  causing	  inequality	  and	  unrest.	  	  With	  the	  economy	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse,	  Argentine	  citizens	  started	  asking	  questions	  and	  pointing	  fingers.	  	  The	  government	  reacted	  by	  suing	  all	  private	  firms	  who	  published	  their	  own,	  likely	  much	  more	  accurate,	  calculations,	  threatening	  the	  accuracy	  and	  readiness	  of	  statistical	  information.	  	  	  Recognizing	  these	  government	  actions	  is	  vital	  to	  understanding	  how	  the	  executive	  powers	  handle	  economic	  distress.	  	  It	  displays	  an	  obvious	  corrupt	  nature	  of	  those	  in	  power	  and	  threatens	  democratic	  freedom	  (“Lies	  and	  Statistics”	  2011).	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   The	  Political	  Business	  Cycle	  theory	  predicts	  increased	  chances	  of	  default	  for	  governments	  and	  nations	  where	  it	  is	  utilized.	  	  It	  proposes	  the	  incumbent	  party	  will	  make	  use	  of	  policies	  that	  have	  a	  better	  short-­‐run	  trade-­‐off	  in	  order	  to	  appease	  voters,	  but	  the	  party	  is	  then	  unable	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  these	  policies	  after	  reelection	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  	  PBC	  theory	  states	  that	  leftist	  governments,	  like	  those	  of	  the	  Partido	  Justicialismo,	  historically	  have	  stronger	  correlations	  to	  market	  failure	  than	  do	  more	  conservative	  governments.	   Also,	  the	  theory	  implies	  that	  voters	  vote	  retrospectively,	  voting	  either	  for	  or	  against	  the	  incumbent	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  	  Here,	  Argentine	  voters	  generally	  either	  approve	  of	  the	  current	  economic	  state	  and	  vote	  to	  reelect	  whoever	  currently	  holds	  office,	  or	  they	  vote	  against	  this	  incumbent	  based	  on	  a	  disapproval	  of	  the	  current	  economic	  state.	  	  Just	  prior	  to	  the	  reelection	  of	  Cristina	  Kirchner,	  current	  president	  of	  Argentina,	  The	  Economist	  stated	  that,	  “it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  attribute	  Ms	  Fernández’s	  (Kirchner)	  looming	  victory	  to	  luck,”	  (“Flying	  Solo”	  2011).	  	  Although	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  was	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse,	  Kirchner	  proceeded	  with	  policies	  that	  emphasized	  social	  spending	  and	  increasingly	  subsidized	  energy	  and	  transportation.	  	  Through	  her	  handle	  on	  the	  central	  bank,	  she	  continued	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash,	  producing	  inflation	  rates	  estimated	  around	  20%.	  	  To	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  a	  flourishing	  economy,	  she	  introduced	  policies	  to	  freeze	  prices	  and	  expand	  welfare	  benefits	  and	  pensions	  for	  government	  dependents	  (“Flying	  Solo”	  2011).	  	  She	  even	  gave	  government	  employees	  raises	  of	  up	  to	  30%	  (“Lies	  and	  Statistics”	  2011).	  	   The	  PBC	  model	  promotes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  rates.	  	  “The	  reason	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  that	  in	  both	  competitive	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labor	  markets	  and	  in	  unionized	  sectors	  a	  low	  unemployment	  rate	  means	  a	  higher	  demand	  relative	  to	  the	  labor	  force	  and	  a	  higher	  cost	  of	  strikes”	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  Individuals	  logically	  prefer	  times	  of	  low	  unemployment	  rates.	  	  Although	  individuals	  would	  naturally	  prefer	  periods	  of	  steady	  prices	  or	  at	  least	  stabilized	  inflation	  rates,	  the	  PBC	  model	  assumes	  the	  average	  voter’s	  knowledge	  of	  this	  topic	  to	  be	  negligible	  	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  Therefore,	  as	  seen	  in	  Kirchner’s	  policymaking	  and	  subsequent	  success,	  voters	  respond	  well	  to	  lowered	  unemployment	  rates	  and	  increasing	  inflation	  from	  a	  flooded	  market.	  	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  4	  below,	  unemployment	  rates	  decreased	  significantly	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Kirchner’s	  reelection	  in	  2011	  and	  rose	  subsequent	  to	  her	  regaining	  office.	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  4.	  Unemployment	  Rate	  (2010-­‐3)	  (Trading	  Economics)	  The	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  enacting	  political	  business	  cycle	  policy	  are	  overwhelmingly	  negative.	  	  Argentina	  lost	  $2	  billion	  of	  capital	  monthly	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  reelection	  of	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  due	  to	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  and	  increasing	  social	  spending.	  	  (“Flying	  Solo”	  2011)	  	  This	  consequently	  led	  to	  a	  rise	  in	  inflation	  rates	  that	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might	  have	  demonstrated	  to	  her	  constituency	  a	  growing	  threat	  to	  economic	  stability,	  had	  they	  been	  motivated	  to	  be	  well	  informed	  or	  even	  able	  to	  find	  accurate	  statistical	  information.	  	  As	  the	  government	  from	  2007	  up	  until	  Kirchner’s	  reelection	  published	  falsified	  numbers,	  people	  turned	  to	  private	  economic	  analysts.	  	  When,	  in	  2011,	  private	  economists	  published	  an	  estimated	  inflation	  rate	  of	  25%	  when	  the	  government	  stated	  inflation	  was	  around	  10%,	  the	  government	  investigated	  and	  fined	  analyst	  firms	  (“Lies	  and	  Statistics”	  2011).	  	  A	  September	  2013	  article	  from	  The	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CHAPTER	  III.	  	  Research	  Data	  and	  Methodology	  
	   Essentially,	  this	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  measure	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  economic	  wellbeing	  of	  Argentina.	  	  Undoubtedly,	  a	  variety	  of	  macroeconomic	  factors	  will	  influence	  the	  nation’s	  near-­‐term	  economic	  conditions.	  Internal	  fiscal	  policies	  heavily	  influence	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  well,	  and	  as	  previously	  stated,	  many	  present-­‐day	  policies	  are	  jeopardizing	  the	  current	  economic	  state.	  	  To	  forecast	  Argentina’s	  immediate	  economic	  future,	  I	  selected	  independent	  variables	  that	  will	  predict	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  
A.	  Dependent	  Variable	  Dependent	  Variables:	  	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  growth	  rates,	  unemployment	  	   	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  macroeconomic	  condition	  of	  Argentina.	  	  More	  specifically,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  information	  gathered	  about	  the	  global	  economic	  climate	  and	  internal	  economic	  policy	  to	  draw	  a	  connection	  to	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  growth	  rates,	  and	  unemployment	  rates	  that	  resulted.	  	  I	  will	  also	  analyze	  the	  patterns	  of	  change	  in	  these	  figures	  over	  time.	  	  Then,	  I	  will	  use	  these	  findings	  to	  predict	  how	  these	  rates	  will	  change	  in	  the	  future.	  
B.	  Independent	  Variable	  Independent	  Variables:	  	  Argentine	  market	  and	  policy	  type	   	  	   To	  determine	  the	  future	  of	  Argentina’s	  economy,	  I	  first	  analyze	  the	  past.	  	  Two	  main	  factors	  are	  relevant	  here:	  	  the	  Argentine	  market	  and	  policy	  type.	  	  Obviously	  looking	  backwards	  is	  relatively	  easy.	  	  There	  are	  various	  reliable	  sources	  with	  data	  on	  the	  global	  market	  over	  the	  years.	  	  A	  number	  of	  publications	  detailing	  the	  reasons	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for	  the	  2001	  economic	  crash	  are	  available.	  	  Pedro	  Pou’s	  article	  "Argentina's	  Structural	  Reforms	  of	  the	  1990s”	  for	  Finance	  &	  Development	  gives	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  IMF-­‐backed	  policy	  in	  Argentina	  prior	  to	  the	  2001	  crash.	  	  This	  article	  was	  published	  in	  the	  IMF	  quarterly	  magazine	  a	  year	  before	  Argentina’s	  economic	  crash.	  	  It	  outlines	  in	  great	  detail	  the	  economic	  policy	  established	  and	  sustained	  by	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  in	  Argentina.	  	  It	  is	  divided	  into	  sections:	  	  Trade	  liberalization,	  tax	  reforms;	  Financial	  system	  reforms;	  Banking	  regulations;	  Payment	  system	  reforms;	  Ongoing	  reforms.	  	  This	  provides	  a	  reliable	  scholarly	  source	  for	  any	  necessary	  details	  regarding	  the	  policy	  that	  predated	  the	  crash.	  	  Further,	  the	  article	  ends	  with	  a	  section	  entitled	  “Some	  concerns	  remain,”	  which	  provides	  a	  unique	  pre-­‐crash	  perspective	  about	  what	  might	  go	  wrong.	  	  This	  will	  allow	  for	  a	  thorough	  evaluation	  of	  what	  happened	  before	  and	  after	  the	  crash	  in	  terms	  strictly	  regarding	  economic	  policy	  (Pou	  2000).	  Additionally,	  Edwin	  Truman	  wrote	  an	  article	  in	  2002	  for	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  entitled	  “Fixed	  Exchange	  Rates:	  	  The	  Lessons	  From	  Argentina”	  about	  how	  the	  Convertibility	  Plan	  affected	  the	  economy.	  	  This	  article	  was	  written	  at	  the	  most	  depressed	  moment	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economic	  crash	  by	  an	  expert	  on	  international	  economics.	  	  Truman	  details	  the	  economic	  policy	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  crash,	  outlining	  events	  from	  1991	  to	  2001.	  	  He	  explains	  how	  the	  powers	  that	  be	  determined	  the	  future	  of	  Argentina.	  	  He	  notes	  exactly	  how	  the	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  caused	  lasting	  damage	  for	  the	  nation	  (Truman	  2002).	  	  His	  expertise	  and	  insight	  proves	  useful	  in	  analyzing	  the	  roots	  of	  economic	  strife	  that	  still	  affects	  the	  nation.	  	  It	  will	  also	  help	  in	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  government	  creates	  policies	  that	  are	  not	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  Argentina.	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Next,	  I	  observe	  economic	  statistical	  data	  from	  2001	  to	  the	  present.	  This	  era	  is	  dominated	  by	  Kirchnerism	  since	  either	  Nestór	  Kirchner	  or	  his	  wife	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  has	  served	  as	  President	  since	  2003.	  	  Their	  brand	  of	  economic	  policy	  is	  unique,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  data	  to	  analyze.	  	  These	  economic	  and	  financial	  periodicals	  are	  up	  to	  date	  on	  the	  most	  recent	  events	  with	  any	  possible	  effect	  on	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  and	  write	  on	  them	  with	  accuracy	  and	  brevity.	  For	  example,	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  is	  currently	  utilizing	  a	  program	  to	  combat	  the	  black	  market	  for	  dollars	  that	  offers	  a	  trade-­‐in	  for	  the	  suspected	  $160	  billion	  illegally	  held	  by	  Argentine	  citizens	  (“Fistful”	  2013).	  	  Few	  suspect	  it	  will	  work.	  	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  Reporte	  Inmobiliario,	  a	  property	  journal,	  Daniel	  Muchnick,	  an	  economist,	  wondered:	  “Who,	  how	  and	  in	  what	  way	  is	  someone	  going	  to	  want	  to	  take	  their	  illegal	  money	  and	  enter	  into	  the	  conventional	  world?	  And	  moreover,	  who	  is	  going	  to	  want	  to	  invest	  their	  assets	  in	  a	  place	  where	  foreign	  currency	  can	  enter,	  but	  it	  will	  not	  be	  allowed	  out?”	  (“Fistful”	  2013).	  	  Though	  this	  article	  presents	  an	  obvious	  bias,	  citizens	  presumably	  mistrust	  their	  currency	  since	  they	  are	  hoarding	  dollars	  illegally.	  	  	  These	  insecurities	  are	  telling	  of	  what	  is	  to	  come	  for	  Argentina.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  distress,	  citizens	  refuse	  to	  give	  up	  their	  dollars	  in	  exchange	  for	  rewards	  from	  the	  government	  since	  they	  view	  the	  peso	  as	  having	  a	  huge	  risk	  premium.	  	  Mistrust	  at	  this	  level	  displays	  how	  Argentina	  will	  react	  when	  teetering	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  collapse.	  Further,	  it	  explains	  how	  the	  average	  Argentine	  views	  the	  government.	  	  The	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  are	  just	  now	  revealing	  themselves.	  	  The	  
Economist	  article,	  “Argentina’s	  Dollar	  Tourists:	  	  A	  Vacation	  from	  Inflation,”	  addresses	  how	  desperately	  Argentina	  is	  trying	  to	  hoard	  dollars	  by	  monitoring	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international	  tourism,	  especially	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  order	  to	  purchase	  US	  dollars,	  citizens	  must	  apply	  through	  the	  agency	  months	  before	  their	  scheduled	  departure.	  	  The	  likelihood	  of	  receiving	  money	  in	  the	  amount	  requested	  is	  so	  little	  that	  most	  travelers	  turn	  to	  the	  black	  market,	  but	  the	  exchange	  rate	  is	  nearly	  double	  the	  official	  rate	  (“Dollar	  Tourists”	  2013).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  obvious	  inference	  is	  that	  the	  Argentine	  government	  actively	  tries	  to	  prevent	  its	  citizens	  from	  visiting	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  policy	  reach	  the	  economy,	  preventing	  many	  Argentines	  from	  being	  able	  to	  travel	  to	  and	  from	  the	  US.	  	   Another	  determining	  factor	  in	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  will	  be	  the	  profitability	  of	  energy.	  	  An	  article	  from	  The	  Economist,	  “Flogging	  a	  Dead	  Cow:	  	  Argentina	  and	  the	  YPF”	  provides	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  nation’s	  oil	  refinery	  YPF	  and	  the	  government.	  	  This	  article	  outlines	  the	  nationalization	  of	  YPF,	  Argentina’s	  oil	  company,	  and	  its	  economic	  effects.	  	  The	  energy	  industry	  is	  dwindling,	  destroying	  a	  major	  sector	  of	  Argentina’s	  former	  GDP.	  	  The	  discovery	  of	  new	  oil	  may	  change	  the	  economy	  for	  the	  better,	  but	  political	  direction	  from	  Kirchner	  could	  sabotage	  the	  benefits	  for	  the	  nation	  (“Flogging	  a	  Dead	  Cow”	  2013).	  	  This	  article	  not	  only	  highlights	  an	  important	  event	  in	  the	  economic	  goings	  on,	  but	  it	  displays	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  government	  manipulates	  economic	  policy	  for	  its	  benefit.	  	  Here,	  a	  deal	  with	  Chevron	  might	  subject	  economic	  development	  in	  Argentina	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  	  The	  article	  provides	  a	  good	  sense	  of	  the	  grasp	  of	  the	  Argentine	  democratic	  system	  on	  economic	  prosperity.	  Besides	  this,	  political	  policies	  and	  the	  motives	  that	  drive	  them	  are	  studied.	  	  Though	  Menem	  and	  the	  Kirchners	  all	  represent	  the	  same	  political	  party,	  Partido	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Justicialismo,	  their	  policies	  and	  constituents	  are	  vastly	  different.	  	  While	  Menem	  found	  support	  in	  rich	  business	  owners	  and	  middle	  class	  professionals,	  the	  Kirchners	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  urban	  lower	  class	  (Stokes	  2001).	  	  In	  Mandates	  and	  Democracy,	  Susan	  Stokes	  demonstrates	  the	  tendency	  of	  Latin	  American	  presidents,	  once	  in	  office,	  to	  make	  drastic	  changes	  to	  economic	  policy	  promises	  made	  before	  they	  are	  elected.	  	  She	  highlights	  how	  Menem	  did	  so	  and	  was	  still	  able	  to	  get	  reelected.	  	  She	  uses	  models	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  pro-­‐market	  policy	  changes	  are	  frequent	  and	  may	  be	  eroding	  democracy	  throughout	  Latin	  America.	  	  Much	  of	  her	  work	  highlights	  how	  Menem	  managed	  to	  win	  reelection	  after	  making	  such	  drastic	  changes	  to	  his	  promises	  and	  which	  sectors	  of	  the	  population	  are	  voting	  for	  whom	  (Stokes	  2001).	  	  	  “Perverse	  Accountability:	  	  A	  Formal	  Model	  of	  Machine	  Politics	  with	  Evidence	  from	  Argentina”,	  an	  article	  written	  by	  Stokes,	  provides	  further	  insight	  into	  how	  political	  machines	  like	  the	  Partido	  Justicialismo	  get	  elected.	  	  She	  discusses	  in	  detail	  the	  loyalty	  of	  voters	  to	  a	  certain	  party	  from	  which	  they	  are	  receiving	  certain	  benefits.	  	  Further,	  it	  highlights	  how	  accountability	  is	  used	  to	  circumvent	  secret	  ballot	  and	  insure	  votes.	  	  This	  situation	  is	  exemplified	  in	  Argentina,	  showing	  how	  PBC	  theory	  is	  applicable	  in	  Argentine	  politics	  (Stokes	  2005).	  	  The	  article	  tests	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  machine	  politics	  on	  voters	  and	  vice	  versa	  in	  Argentina.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  Stokes’	  work,	  Javier	  Auyero	  explores	  the	  central	  relevance	  of	  clientelism	  in	  Argentina.	  	  It	  studies	  the	  long	  assumed	  theory	  of	  clientelism	  in	  buying	  votes	  and	  questions	  the	  theory’s	  accuracy.	  	  Auyero	  suggests	  a	  different	  theory,	  asserting	  that	  voter-­‐politician	  relationships	  are	  complex,	  deep	  seated,	  and	  emotional.	  	  He	  shows	  how,	  in	  Argentina,	  despite	  the	  actions	  of	  government	  officials,	  voters	  feel	  an	  emotional	  tie	  to	  these	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certain	  people.	  	  Motives	  behind	  voting	  are	  not	  what	  have	  long	  been	  assumed	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  Argentina	  (Auyero	  2001).	  	  This	  book	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  study	  of	  voter	  motivation	  and	  reelection.	  
C.	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  study’s	  postulations	  Though	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy,	  is	  narrowly	  focused,	  it	  has	  significance.	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  Argentina	  is	  the	  fifth	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  Americas	  and	  the	  second	  largest	  in	  South	  America	  specifically.	  	  Just	  as	  it	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  global	  economy,	  it	  has	  a	  great	  effect	  the	  global	  economy.	  	  This	  study	  will	  serve	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  economic	  trajectory	  of	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Its	  status	  as	  a	  major	  power	  in	  Latin	  America	  has	  been	  unwavering	  despite	  the	  cycle	  of	  crisis.	  	  Argentina	  is	  an	  important	  trading	  partner	  of	  Brazil,	  Mexico,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Currently,	  Argentine	  companies	  that	  defaulted	  on	  debt	  in	  US	  markets	  are	  involved	  in	  lawsuits	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  This	  is	  blocking	  them	  from	  capital	  markets,	  naturally	  affecting	  the	  possibility	  for	  prosperity.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  this	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  	  
There	  are	  many	  factors	  that	  will	  determine	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy.	  	  As	  I	  progress	  in	  this	  economic	  analysis,	  PBC	  theory	  will	  be	  central	  to	  my	  study.	  	  The	  graphs	  shown	  above	  provide	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  analysis	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  build	  upon.	  	  Inflation	  rates,	  exchange	  rates,	  government	  spending,	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita	  will	  be	  crucial	  to	  determine	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  major	  trends	  seems	  to	  point	  towards	  Argentina	  being	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  another	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Further	  analysis	  will	  hopefully	  prove	  this	  assumption	  correct.	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CHAPTER	  IV.	  Menem	  Era	  (1989-­‐1999)	  
For	  most	  of	  the	  period	  between	  1975	  and	  1990,	  Argentina	  experienced	  annual	  hyperinflation	  averaging	  325%,	  negative	  GDP	  growth,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  national	  bank	  and	  central	  government.	  	  These	  problems	  culminated	  during	  the	  presidency	  of	  Raul	  Alfonsín	  (1983-­‐1989)	  when	  inflation	  reached	  5000%	  in	  1989.	  	  With	  the	  economy	  crumbling	  around	  him,	  Alfonsín	  resigned	  five	  months	  early	  in	  July	  1989,	  and	  Carlos	  Menem	  assumed	  the	  role	  of	  president.	  	  Carlos	  Menem’s	  presidency	  lasted	  ten	  years	  until	  December	  1999.	  	  His	  time	  in	  office	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  moderate	  Peronist	  program	  that	  called	  for	  a	  free	  market	  economy	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  On	  the	  campaign	  trail,	  he	  assured	  voters	  that	  he	  would	  not	  use	  “the	  hunger	  of	  the	  Argentine	  people”	  to	  pay	  the	  nation’s	  debt	  (Stokes	  46).	  	  	  This	  initially	  meant	  lowering	  trade	  tariffs	  based	  on	  a	  wage-­‐price	  pact	  between	  labor,	  business,	  and	  government.	  	  He	  ran	  as	  a	  Peronist,	  representing	  a	  traditional	  Peronist	  constituency.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  this	  meant	  urban	  laborers,	  industrialists,	  and	  residents	  of	  rural	  provinces.	  	  The	  urban	  poor	  fought	  for	  higher	  wages,	  industrialists	  sought	  promotion	  of	  local	  businesses,	  and	  rural	  provinces	  hoped	  to	  attract	  attention	  and	  draw	  budgetary	  resources.	  	  Menem	  promised	  his	  constituents	  these	  reforms	  in	  typical	  Peronist	  fashion,	  promising	  to	  repair	  the	  economy,	  but	  not	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  people	  (UNC).	  	  	  
To	  help	  carry	  out	  his	  economic	  scheme,	  Menem	  unexpectedly	  enlisted	  the	  aid	  of	  former	  top-­‐level	  executives	  from	  Bunge	  y	  Born,	  a	  major	  agribusiness	  and	  one	  of	  Argentina’s	  leading	  corporations	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  Miguel	  Roig,	  former	  Bunge	  y	  Born	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vice	  president	  and	  an	  “outstanding	  symbol	  of	  vendepatria	  [sellout]	  capitalism	  to	  all	  Peronists”	  was	  named	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  (Stokes	  46).	  	  This	  initial	  shock	  to	  Menem’s	  Peronist	  constituency	  was	  met	  with	  other	  cabinet	  appointments	  from	  Bunge	  y	  Born.	  Their	  plan	  consisted	  of	  three	  primary	  parts:	  	  1)	  currency	  devaluation,	  2)	  privatization	  of	  government-­‐owned	  industries,	  including	  telecommunications,	  airlines,	  television	  and	  radio	  stations	  and	  petrochemicals,	  and	  3)	  phasing	  out	  of	  export	  taxes	  and	  import	  tariffs.	  	  	  Menem	  considered	  his	  austerity	  plan	  a	  severe	  but	  necessary	  adjustment,	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  “major	  surgery	  [with]	  no	  anesthesia,”	  	  (Stokes	  47).	  	  He	  no	  longer	  championed	  the	  Peronist	  ideals	  with	  which	  he	  won	  the	  presidency,	  but	  instead	  drastically	  shifted	  to	  neoliberalist	  policies	  in	  hopes	  of	  repairing	  the	  economy.	  When	  inflation	  persisted	  and	  the	  Bunge	  y	  Born	  plan	  manifested	  its	  shortcomings	  and	  ineffectiveness,	  Menem	  called	  on	  Domingo	  Cavallo	  to	  serve	  as	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  in	  1991	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  	  
Domingo	  Cavallo	  had	  a	  plan	  of	  his	  own,	  and	  he	  took	  measures	  to	  implement	  a	  far-­‐reaching	  program	  of	  economic	  stabilization	  that	  also	  enhanced	  revenue	  collection	  and	  prevented	  tax	  evasion	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  The	  Convertibility	  Plan	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  removing	  state	  influence	  over	  the	  economy,	  and	  this	  was	  manifested	  in	  three	  overarching	  goals:	  	  1)	  privatizing	  of	  government	  industries	  and	  public	  services,	  2)	  transferring	  these	  functions	  and	  services	  to	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  3)	  reducing	  the	  fiscal	  deficit	  (Quiroga	  124).	  	  Cavallo	  continued	  with	  the	  privatization	  of	  major	  government-­‐owned	  businesses	  started	  during	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  Menem’s	  presidency,	  marking	  the	  move	  towards	  neoliberalism	  in	  Argentina	  (128).	  	  Privatization	  represented	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  the	  fiscal	  deficit	  and	  establish	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macroeconomic	  equilibrium,	  and	  its	  immediate	  successes	  were	  evident	  (128).	  	  	  	  
Privatization	  in	  Argentina	  can	  be	  characterized	  in	  three	  ways:	  	  1)	  comprehensive,	  2)	  fast,	  and	  3)	  supported	  by	  the	  public	  (Ariceta	  53).	  	  In	  three	  or	  four	  years,	  nearly	  every	  government	  owned	  entity	  was	  privatized.	  The	  public’s	  positive	  perspective	  remained	  unchanged	  initially	  because	  the	  first	  privatized	  sectors	  had	  little	  to	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  consumer	  prices.	  	  	  When	  oil,	  gas,	  and	  other	  similar	  sectors	  were	  privatized,	  the	  government	  lost	  the	  capacity	  to	  influence	  commodity	  prices	  in	  the	  economy	  (53).	  	  Citizens	  began	  to	  take	  notice	  due	  to	  the	  rapidity	  with	  which	  privatizations	  occurred.	  	  Menem	  acted	  hastily	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  He	  wanted	  to	  prove	  his	  steadfast	  determination	  to	  improve	  the	  economy	  and	  close	  the	  fiscal	  deficit,	  and	  he	  had	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  that	  might	  close	  at	  any	  moment	  (53).	  	  Since	  public	  services	  had	  deteriorated,	  support	  for	  Menem’s	  plan	  was	  widespread.	  Although	  experts	  advised	  a	  slow	  transitional	  restructuring	  of	  enterprises,	  Menem	  instead	  acted	  swiftly	  before	  losing	  the	  people’s	  support	  (53).	  	  	  
The	  privatization	  of	  Yacimientos	  Petrolíferos	  Fiscales	  (YPF),	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  petroleum	  refineries,	  occurred	  in	  June	  1993	  under	  Cavallo	  and	  Menem.	  	  As	  profits	  soared,	  thousands	  lost	  their	  jobs	  when	  YPF	  fired	  at	  least	  40,000	  Argentine	  employees.	  	  Aerolíneas	  Argentinas,	  the	  primary	  Argentine	  airline,	  had	  already	  undergone	  privatization	  in	  November	  1990.	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  opposition	  of	  government	  employees,	  most	  citizens	  initially	  viewed	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  reform	  favorably.	  Besides	  these	  government	  industries,	  many	  public	  services	  like	  health	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and	  education	  were	  privatized	  as	  well.	  	  In	  1992,	  these	  responsibilities	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  provinces	  and	  municipality	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  (125).	  	  	  
Government	  reform	  intended	  to	  reduce	  the	  fiscal	  deficit	  centered	  on	  creating	  financial	  autonomy	  through	  a	  free	  market	  and	  open	  trade	  (Quiroga	  131).	  The	  linchpin	  of	  Cavallo’s	  plan	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  convertibility	  between	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  and	  the	  US	  dollar	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  Argentina's	  currency	  board	  established	  a	  fixed	  pegging	  of	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  parity	  between	  the	  peso	  and	  dollar	  that	  guaranteed	  full	  convertibility	  of	  pesos	  into	  U.S.	  dollars	  in	  hopes	  of	  establishing	  international	  credibility.	  In	  1989,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  peso	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  US	  dollar	  was	  0.18	  to	  1.	  	  It	  rose	  to	  0.56	  to	  1,	  but	  the	  Convertibility	  Law	  that	  doubled	  the	  value	  of	  the	  peso	  making	  the	  rate	  1	  to	  1	  was	  still	  drastic	  (Saxton	  5).	  	  Reforms	  in	  Argentina’s	  economic	  system	  were	  faster	  and	  deeper	  than	  any	  country	  outside	  the	  former	  communist	  block	  (5).	  	  The	  plan	  also	  forbade	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  by	  requiring	  increases	  in	  the	  money	  supply	  to	  be	  backed	  by	  foreign	  reserves	  (Stokes	  47).	  	  The	  currency	  board	  regime	  intended	  to	  stabilize	  the	  peso,	  encourage	  both	  foreign	  and	  local	  investment,	  and	  foster	  sustained	  economic	  growth.	  	  The	  plan	  was	  enacted	  in	  March	  1991,	  and	  by	  August	  the	  annual	  inflation	  rate	  had	  fallen	  to	  1.5	  percent,	  the	  lowest	  in	  17	  years.	  Capital	  flight	  was	  reversed,	  and	  in	  1992	  Argentina	  emerged	  with	  a	  reformed	  and	  apparently	  stable	  economy	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  The	  initial	  success	  of	  the	  Menem	  era	  was,	  without	  a	  doubt,	  the	  stabilization	  of	  the	  economy	  through	  inflation	  control	  and	  reliable	  currency	  (Quiroga	  131).	  	  Figure	  5	  below	  shows	  the	  drastic	  drop	  in	  inflation	  rates	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Convertibility	  Law	  in	  the	  early	  2000’s.	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  Figure	  5.	  Inflation	  Rate	  (1988-­‐2000)	  (Pou	  2000)	  
In	  1993	  the	  ruling	  Peronist	  Party	  launched	  a	  campaign	  for	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  that	  would	  permit	  the	  president	  to	  run	  for	  an	  immediate	  second	  term	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  Menem’s	  popularity	  provided	  a	  path	  to	  rewrite	  the	  constitution	  and	  modify	  presidential	  term	  limits	  in	  order	  to	  run	  in	  1995	  (Stokes	  47).	  	  Ex	  post	  support	  for	  neoliberal	  policies	  that	  drove	  Argentina’s	  economic	  turnaround	  sustained	  his	  eventual	  reelection	  (138).	  	  In	  elections	  held	  in	  October,	  the	  Peronists	  gained	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  but	  still	  needed	  support	  from	  the	  Radicals	  to	  change	  the	  constitution.	  Former	  president	  Alfonsín	  eventually	  consented	  to	  support	  the	  reforms	  in	  an	  agreement	  called	  the	  Olivos	  Pact	  (Pou	  2000).	  The	  new	  constitution,	  enacted	  in	  1994,	  had	  few	  changes	  aside	  from	  the	  newly	  written	  provision	  for	  presidential	  term	  limits	  allowing	  consecutive	  terms.	  	  Although	  public	  unease	  about	  rising	  unemployment	  was	  a	  factor,	  Menem	  made	  a	  campaign	  promise	  to	  “pulverize	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unemployment	  as	  we	  pulverized	  inflation,”	  (Stokes	  139).	  	  With	  this	  assurance,	  Menem	  decisively	  won	  reelection	  in	  1995.	  	  
The	  beginning	  of	  his	  second	  four-­‐year	  term	  in	  1995	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  “Tequila	  Crisis”	  in	  Mexico,	  a	  currency	  crisis	  resulting	  from	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Mexico	  peso	  in	  late	  1994,	  foreshadowing	  the	  2001	  Argentine	  crisis	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  When	  the	  Mexican	  government	  imposed	  an	  abrupt	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Mexican	  peso,	  limited	  Mexican	  buying	  power	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  South	  American	  economy	  and	  Argentina	  in	  particular.	  	  Many	  feared	  that	  Argentina	  would	  face	  devaluation	  similar	  to	  Mexico’s	  even	  though	  its	  monetary	  system	  was	  fundamentally	  different	  (Saxton	  6).	  	  With	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  pared	  to	  the	  US	  dollar,	  the	  currency	  was	  overvalued	  and	  increasingly	  fewer	  Latin	  American	  economies	  could	  afford	  to	  purchase	  Argentine	  goods	  and	  sustain	  their	  economic	  growth	  and	  stability.	  	  The	  Mexican	  crisis	  had	  far	  reaching	  effects	  on	  most	  of	  Latin	  America,	  and	  the	  value	  disparity	  between	  the	  peso	  and	  dollar	  led	  to	  an	  eventual	  1995	  recession.	  	  Though	  the	  peso	  was	  overvalued	  from	  the	  start,	  the	  Mexican	  crisis	  crippled	  many	  Latin	  American	  economies,	  weakening	  their	  buying	  power,	  especially	  relative	  to	  overpriced	  Argentine	  goods	  (7).	  	  After	  a	  brief	  recovery	  from	  the	  Mexico	  crisis,	  recessions	  in	  Russia	  and	  Brazil,	  Argentina’s	  major	  trading	  partner,	  led	  to	  another	  brief	  Argentine	  recession.	  	  Brazil	  could	  no	  longer	  trade	  with	  Argentina	  in	  high	  volumes	  as	  it	  had	  previously	  done,	  and	  Argentine	  interest	  rates	  peaked	  (7).	  	  The	  fiscal	  deficit	  resurfaced	  and	  continued	  growing	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  Menem’s	  presidency	  (Quiroga	  131).	  	  Convertibility,	  although	  initially	  successful,	  could	  not	  guarantee	  growth.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  Menem	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  overarching	  goal	  of	  fiscal	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control	  (131).	  	  	  
The	  popularity	  of	  the	  Menem	  regime	  began	  to	  erode	  early	  in	  his	  second	  term	  when	  unemployment	  rates	  and	  accusations	  of	  corruption	  noticeably	  increased.	  	  Unemployment	  was	  manageable	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  6.0%	  in	  1991	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  Cavallo’s	  Convertibility	  Plan,	  but	  it	  rose	  to	  16.6%	  by	  1995	  when	  the	  Tequila	  Crisis	  occurred	  (Saxton	  5).	  Figure	  6	  plots	  unemployment	  from	  1989	  to	  1999,	  peaking	  after	  a	  wave	  of	  neoliberalist	  reforms	  and	  the	  Mexican	  peso	  crisis.	  
	  
	   Figure	  6.	  Unemployment	  Rate	  (1988-­‐2000)	  (Pou	  2000)	  
Menem’s	  increasing	  disagreements	  with	  Cavallo	  over	  economic	  policy	  did	  not	  affect	  Menem’s	  political	  control	  and	  the	  economy	  temporarily	  stabilized	  when	  Menem	  dismissed	  Cavallo	  in	  July	  1996	  (Pou	  2000).	  	  Within	  a	  year,	  however,	  a	  recession	  related	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  and	  Russian	  recessions	  took	  hold	  of	  the	  nation’s	  economy,	  made	  worse	  by	  the	  overvalued	  Argentine	  currency.	  	  Menem	  strove	  to	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make	  further	  constitutional	  amendments	  so	  he	  could	  run	  for	  a	  third	  consecutive	  term,	  but	  his	  efforts	  were	  fruitless	  (Saxton	  6).	  	  He	  tried	  and	  failed	  to	  persuade	  interest	  groups	  to	  follow	  his	  cause,	  and	  this	  ultimately	  led	  him	  to	  make	  questionable	  decisions	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  Argentines	  regarding	  the	  economy	  (6).	  	  	  
His	  policy	  changes	  did	  not	  resemble	  the	  campaign	  promises	  he	  employed	  to	  win	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  1991.	  	  In	  order	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investors	  during	  his	  first	  term,	  he	  lowered	  labor	  costs	  and	  minimized	  the	  rights	  of	  his	  primary	  constituency,	  the	  urban	  working	  class.	  	  Labor	  rights	  were	  drastically	  reduced,	  and	  many	  employed	  by	  the	  state	  were	  left	  unemployed	  when	  the	  government	  fired	  nearly	  150,000	  lower	  level	  employees.	  	  Although	  Menem	  spoke	  out	  against	  his	  predecessor’s	  attempts	  to	  privatize	  government	  industries,	  he	  proceeded	  with	  deregulating	  the	  majority	  of	  government	  owned	  entities.	  	  Privatization	  contributed	  to	  unemployment	  when	  Menem	  left	  the	  working	  class	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  foreign	  investors.	  	  He	  even	  raised	  income	  taxes,	  directly	  contradicting	  his	  campaign	  promises	  (UNC).	  	  His	  constituency	  now	  consisted	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  factions	  that	  excluded	  his	  urban	  poor	  voters.	  	  Military	  officials	  pledged	  their	  support	  to	  Menem’s	  new	  regime,	  along	  with	  those	  who	  found	  favor	  in	  his	  neoliberal	  economic	  policy.	  	  Foreign	  creditors	  and	  investors	  profited	  from	  Menem’s	  implicit	  cooperation	  in	  negotiating	  profitable	  investments,	  and	  large	  national	  industrialists	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  purchase	  government	  businesses	  benefitted	  from	  his	  ideological	  shift.	  	  After	  opening	  the	  economy	  to	  free	  trade,	  Menem	  gained	  the	  support	  of	  commodities	  exporters	  who	  mostly	  exported	  wheat,	  beef,	  and	  grain	  (Huber	  23).	  	  Workers,	  the	  middle	  class,	  and	  small	  business	  owners	  were	  hung	  out	  to	  dry	  after	  Menem’s	  shift	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away	  from	  traditional	  Peronist	  politics.	  	  
Throughout	  his	  presidency,	  Menem	  was	  known	  for	  taking	  extraordinary	  measures	  to	  make	  economic	  reform.	  	  He	  laid	  claim	  on	  “poderes	  excepcionales	  [exceptional	  powers]”	  to	  accomplish	  his	  plan,	  claiming	  that	  the	  widespread	  inflation	  and	  uncertainty	  necessitated	  extreme	  measures	  (Quiroga	  124).	  	  Menem	  made	  laws	  by	  emergency	  decree	  instead	  of	  the	  normal	  law-­‐making	  process.	  	  Even	  within	  Menem’s	  Peronist	  party,	  there	  was	  strong	  opposition	  to	  many	  reforms,	  but	  he	  acted	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  few	  big	  business	  constituents.	  	  Privatizations	  were	  particularly	  controversial	  because	  they	  lacked	  transparency	  and	  often	  favored	  monopolies.	  	  Large	  companies	  retained	  autonomy	  and	  power	  within	  Argentina,	  becoming	  profitable	  sectors	  and	  benefitting	  the	  wealthy	  owners	  and	  overseas	  investors.	  	  Further,	  outsourcing	  from	  privatization	  caused	  job	  displacement	  for	  many,	  likely	  negatively	  affecting	  the	  aggregate	  unemployment	  rate.	  	  Rising	  unemployment	  contradicts	  traditional	  PBC	  theory,	  but	  his	  actions	  on	  behalf	  of	  big	  business	  constituents	  afforded	  him	  many	  personal	  gains,	  displaying	  tendencies	  that	  might	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  political	  business	  cycle.	  	  Privatization	  is	  one	  primary	  source	  of	  corruption	  that	  caused	  many	  Argentines	  to	  lose	  faith	  in	  the	  Menem	  regime	  (Saxton	  7).	  	  Extensive	  investigations	  of	  government	  officials	  were	  pursued,	  and	  many	  revealed	  unsavory	  results.	  	  Market	  reform	  was	  facilitated	  by	  state	  intervention	  in	  law	  making	  and	  the	  privatization	  of	  public	  sector,	  and	  this	  reform	  process	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  corruption.	  The	  sale	  of	  public	  enterprises,	  for	  instance,	  gave	  Menem	  and	  Cavallo	  discretion	  over	  the	  reallocation	  of	  profitable	  commodities,	  widening	  their	  scope	  for	  personal	  gain	  and	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increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  clientelistic	  behavior.	  This	  control	  over	  huge	  streams	  of	  future	  income	  could	  have	  been	  used	  to	  obtain	  exorbitant	  bribes	  or	  extort	  powerful	  citizens	  for	  political	  support,	  as	  is	  said	  to	  have	  occurred	  during	  the	  first	  privatization	  deals	  concluded	  by	  the	  Menem	  administration.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  persistent	  state	  interventionism	  with	  little	  accountability	  and	  minimal	  discretion	  might	  account	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  corruption	  during	  the	  enactment	  of	  Menem’s	  market	  reform	  (Weyland	  1998).	  	  	  Biddings	  over	  government-­‐owned	  businesses	  like	  YPF	  occurred	  in	  a	  politicized	  environment	  where	  international	  third	  party	  bidders	  used	  connections	  to	  influence	  the	  decision-­‐makers	  heavily	  and	  set	  contracts	  on	  favorable	  terms	  (Ariceta	  53).	  	  Although	  privatization	  aided	  in	  repairing	  the	  macroeconomic	  conditions	  of	  Argentina,	  the	  process	  by	  which	  privatizations	  were	  dealt	  out	  to	  bidders	  destroyed	  Argentina’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  government,	  which	  seemed	  to	  be	  controlled	  by	  a	  few	  powerful	  groups	  (55).	  	  	  Most	  of	  the	  hired	  bidders	  once	  served	  as	  government	  contractors,	  and,	  often,	  representatives	  of	  the	  bidding	  private	  companies	  helped	  the	  government	  design	  the	  bids.	  	  Even	  companies	  like	  German	  industrial	  giant	  Siemens	  have	  in	  recent	  years	  admitted	  to	  collusion	  with	  the	  Menem	  regime,	  revealing	  they	  paid	  government	  officials	  $40	  million	  to	  secure	  a	  billion	  dollar	  contract	  for	  ID	  cards	  (AFP	  2008).	  	  	  When	  Siemens	  sought	  exposure	  to	  the	  Argentine	  market,	  Menem	  personally	  signed	  a	  contract	  with	  Siemens	  officials	  to	  forge	  Argentine	  identification	  to	  ease	  their	  troubles	  of	  doing	  business	  in	  a	  foreign	  country	  and	  purportedly	  received	  $2	  million	  in	  the	  exchange	  (AFP	  2008).	  	  The	  Argentine	  people	  sensed	  that	  privatizations	  were	  often	  inappropriate,	  and	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CHAPTER	  V.	  Kirchner	  Era	  (2003-­‐present)	  
	  	   	   The	  economic	  crash	  that	  devastated	  Argentina’s	  economy	  lasted	  for	  approximately	  four	  years	  from	  1998	  to	  2002.	  	  As	  Menem’s	  presidency	  came	  to	  a	  close	  and	  his	  unrealistic	  dream	  of	  a	  third	  consecutive	  term	  died,	  the	  state	  of	  Argentine	  politics	  was	  uncertain.	  	  Two	  presidents	  served	  during	  the	  interim	  from	  December	  1999	  until	  May	  2003	  when	  Peronist	  Nestor	  Kirchner	  was	  elected.	  	  Menem	  defeated	  Kirchner	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections	  but	  subsequently	  dropped	  out,	  leaving	  Kirchner	  to	  serve	  as	  president	  until	  December	  2007.	  	  Kirchner	  assumed	  the	  position	  amidst	  social	  turmoil	  spurned	  by	  the	  crisis,	  and	  a	  run	  on	  banks	  sparked	  outright	  violence	  when	  Argentines	  attacked	  foreign-­‐owned	  banks	  (“Should	  I	  stay?”	  2002).	  	  	  The	  peso	  was	  devalued,	  and	  Argentines	  lost	  their	  private	  savings	  while	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  defaulting	  on	  $80	  billion	  of	  debt.	  	  The	  banking	  system	  was	  near	  destruction	  when	  Nestor	  Kirchner	  started	  his	  presidential	  term	  in	  2003,	  so	  naturally	  his	  brand	  of	  Peronism	  was	  starkly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  	  Kirchnerismo,	  a	  play	  on	  the	  name	  of	  the	  political	  dynasty,	  evokes	  memories	  of	  Peronsimo	  at	  its	  height	  when	  Juan	  and	  Eva	  Perón	  ruled	  together.	  	  Urban	  working	  class	  poor	  and	  youth	  dominate	  their	  constituency.	  	  Peronism	  defined	  the	  population	  in	  new	  terms;	  the	  social	  groups	  targeted	  were	  not	  the	  traditional	  beneficiaries	  of	  government	  favor,	  but	  Peron	  strived	  to	  find	  a	  place	  for	  the	  rural	  and	  urban	  poor.	  	  Kirchnerism	  has	  not	  matched	  the	  proactive	  aide	  Perón	  gave	  to	  his	  constituents,	  but	  it	  has	  sought	  to	  reconfigure	  social	  imbalances	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  goods.	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   From	  2003	  to	  2007,	  Nestor	  Kirchner	  sought	  to	  repair	  the	  economy	  by	  enacting	  responsible,	  conservative	  policies.	  Kirchnerism	  rejected	  the	  harsh	  neoliberal	  policy	  introduced	  by	  Menem,	  calling	  instead	  for	  industrialist	  developmentalism	  that	  disallows	  the	  importation	  of	  goods	  produced	  at	  home.	  	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  protect	  and	  foster	  local	  industry	  and	  lower	  unemployment	  rates,	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  SCRER	  (Stable	  and	  Competitive	  Real	  Exchange	  Rate)	  helps	  to	  insure	  growth	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Further,	  Kirchnerismo	  has	  opposed	  free	  trade	  agreements	  proposed	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  particularly	  in	  2005	  when	  Kirchner	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  FTAA	  (Free	  Trade	  Area	  of	  the	  Americas)	  agreement.	  	  He	  tried	  to	  place	  political	  limits	  on	  the	  free	  reign	  of	  the	  market	  to	  protect	  Argentina	  from	  the	  foreign	  industries	  that	  privatized	  and	  outsourced	  a	  huge	  percentage	  of	  the	  work	  force	  under	  Menem’s	  regime.	  	  Kirchner	  departed	  from	  Menem’s	  old	  practices	  of	  clientelism	  by	  instating	  neocorporatism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  Neocorporatism	  can	  be	  defined	  as,	  “a	  pattern	  of	  peak-­‐level	  negotiation	  in	  which	  monopolistic	  unions,	  business	  associations,	  and	  the	  government	  coordinate	  on	  minimum	  wage	  floors”	  	  (Wylde	  6).	  	  	  	   	   Links	  between	  the	  administration	  and	  private	  industry	  have	  mostly	  weakened,	  but	  unlike	  Menem,	  Kirchner	  did	  not	  abandon	  the	  labor	  movement,	  instead	  giving	  them	  an	  activized	  and	  centralized	  voice	  (7).	  	  Naturally,	  this	  means	  that	  Kirchnerism	  has	  found	  widespread	  support	  in	  the	  growing	  unionized	  labor	  movement,	  but	  Kirchner’s	  rapport	  with	  the	  ‘pueblo’	  is	  second	  to	  economic	  stabilization.	  	  A	  moderate	  balance	  between	  selected	  protectionism	  and	  state	  intervention	  was	  Nestor	  Kirchner’s	  aim,	  and	  it	  is	  representative	  of	  his	  efforts	  to	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please	  his	  urban	  poor	  constituency	  while	  maintaining	  cautious	  economic	  development.	  	   	   Nestor	  Kirchner’s	  most	  significant	  piece	  of	  economic	  policy	  involved	  the	  2005	  debt	  restructuring	  that	  attempted	  to	  find	  solvency	  in	  the	  billions	  of	  US	  dollars	  of	  debt	  on	  which	  the	  national	  government	  defaulted	  four	  years	  earlier.	  In	  desperation,	  the	  government	  borrowed	  approximately	  $23	  billion	  from	  the	  IMF	  during	  2001,	  but	  this	  did	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  the	  default.	  	  In	  2002	  and	  2003,	  foreign	  investors	  fled	  the	  country,	  taking	  the	  flow	  of	  capital	  that	  sustained	  Argentine	  laborers	  with	  them.	  	  In	  2002	  alone,	  the	  peso/dollar	  exchange	  rate	  fell	  to	  four	  pesos	  per	  US	  dollar,	  resulting	  in	  inflation	  rates	  over	  40%	  and	  an	  11%	  drop	  in	  real	  GDP.	  	  Creditors	  denounced	  the	  default,	  and	  George	  W.	  Bush	  vetoed	  proposals	  to	  create	  sovereign	  debt	  restructuring	  that	  would	  destroy	  the	  value	  of	  the	  $550	  million	  owed	  to	  American	  investors	  (Hornbeck	  5).	  	  Most	  investors	  (about	  70-­‐75%)	  accepted	  an	  exchange	  for	  new	  bonds	  worth	  approximately	  35	  cents	  on	  the	  dollar,	  and	  the	  debt	  swap	  involved	  152	  varieties	  of	  paper	  in	  six	  currencies	  under	  eight	  jurisdictions.	  	  Though	  Nestor	  Kirchner	  declared	  it	  a	  “triumph,”	  bondholders	  were	  devastated.	  	  Vulture	  funds	  picked	  up	  discarded	  bonds	  for	  20	  cents	  on	  the	  dollar,	  attempting	  to	  exchange	  them	  for	  peso	  denominations	  worth	  approximately	  35	  cents,	  but	  this	  was	  the	  only	  profitable	  outcome	  of	  the	  debt	  exchange.	  	  The	  2005	  exchange,	  though	  significant,	  left	  many	  creditors	  wanting.	  	  A	  2005	  article	  from	  The	  Economist	  describes	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  the	  exchange	  with	  an	  accompanying	  chart.	  	  The	  article	  states:	  	  	  “Even	  after	  the	  swap,	  Argentina's	  debt	  will	  be	  more	  than	  $120	  billion.	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Indeed,	  the	  152	  varieties	  of	  bonds	  eligible	  for	  the	  exchange	  amounted	  to	  just	  55%	  of	  its	  total	  debt	  last	  year.	  Argentina	  owes	  $13.8	  billion	  to	  the	  IMF	  and	  another	  $15	  billion	  to	  other	  multilateral	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank.	  During	  its	  economic	  crisis	  the	  government	  shouldered	  the	  debts	  of	  the	  provincial	  governments	  and	  stuffed	  the	  country's	  banks	  and	  pension	  funds	  full	  of	  bonds,	  called	  BODENs,	  which	  were	  then	  forcibly	  converted	  to	  pesos.”	  	  The	  chart	  shown	  demonstrates	  these	  discrepancies	  (“A	  Victory?”	  2005).	  	  	  
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  	  Figure	  7.	  2003	  Debt	  Swap	  (“Argentina’s	  Debt	  Restructuring”	  2005)	  	  	   The	  lingering	  debt	  after	  the	  2005	  exchange	  underwent	  another	  effort	  at	  restructuring	  in	  2010	  under	  Cristina	  Kirchner.	  	  After	  serving	  as	  first	  lady,	  Kirchner	  tried	  her	  hand	  at	  governance	  and	  has	  served	  as	  president	  of	  Argentina	  since	  taking	  over	  for	  her	  husband	  in	  2007.	  	  Her	  economic	  policy	  strategy	  closely	  resembled	  that	  of	  her	  predecessor	  for	  her	  first	  term,	  which	  lasted	  until	  2011.	  	  This	  is	  exhibited	  in	  the	  June	  2010	  bond	  exchange	  to	  resolve	  holdouts	  that	  resulted	  in	  Argentina	  decreasing	  its	  debt	  by	  $12.4	  billion.	  	  Argentine	  statistics	  estimated	  in	  2010	  that	  $11.2	  billion	  indebted	  to	  private	  investors	  remained	  after	  the	  exchange,	  an	  amount	  that	  has	  climbed	  to	  over	  $15	  billion	  with	  additional	  interest	  since	  then.	  	  The	  process	  depended	  on	  Kirchner’s	  unyielding	  support	  to	  overrule	  legislature	  that	  prohibited	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further	  debt	  restructuring	  after	  2005.	  	  With	  necessary	  approval,	  the	  deal	  was	  finalized	  four	  months	  later	  (Hornbeck	  10).	  	  After	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  2010	  exchange	  coupled	  with	  the	  2005	  exchange,	  an	  estimated	  92%	  of	  bondholders	  traded	  in	  for	  newly	  issued	  debt,	  a	  reasonably	  “successful”	  exchange	  by	  most	  standards	  (Hornbeck	  4).	  	  Though	  investors	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  50%	  return	  on	  the	  bonds’	  par	  value,	  the	  IMF	  was	  paid	  in	  full	  and	  the	  restructuring	  did	  not	  entirely	  bankrupt	  the	  nation	  (5).	  	  The	  Central	  Bank’s	  international	  reserves	  have	  steadily	  increased,	  up	  nearly	  $5	  billion	  after	  the	  2010	  exchange,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  signify	  improvement	  because	  the	  reserve-­‐coverage	  ratio	  is	  climbing	  as	  well	  (“Argentina	  Financing”	  2010).	  	  When	  The	  Economist	  made	  this	  assessment	  in	  2010,	  budgetary	  plans	  utilized	  Central	  Bank-­‐administered	  reserves	  to	  spur	  national	  industry	  growth	  (“Financing”	  2010).	  	  	  	   The	  BCRA	  (Argentine	  Central	  Bank)	  has	  a	  tight	  hold	  on	  monetary	  policy	  and	  possesses	  the	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  large-­‐scale	  economic	  trends.	  	  	  To	  start,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  has	  significant	  control	  over	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  in	  the	  open	  market.	  	  Further,	  it	  can	  issue	  or	  buy	  bonds	  to	  manipulate	  market	  liquidity	  and	  devalue	  dollar	  purchases.	  (“Financing”	  2010).	  	  This	  power	  is	  significant	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Federal	  Reserve,	  and	  government	  manipulation	  can	  be	  a	  dangerous	  force.	  	  Under	  the	  Kirchner	  regime,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  has	  confiscated	  private	  accounts	  and	  savings,	  imposed	  regulations	  that	  drove	  many	  entrepreneurs	  out	  of	  business,	  imposed	  price	  controls	  on	  commodity	  goods,	  and	  determined	  tariffs	  and	  export	  taxes.	  	  Its	  power	  has	  grown	  due	  to	  vast	  revenues	  from	  subsidized	  utilities	  and	  transportation.	  	  After	  Kirchner	  cut	  regulations	  that	  required	  Argentine	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currency	  to	  be	  backed	  by	  international	  reserves	  in	  2010,	  she	  has	  been	  spending	  excessively.	  	  In	  practice,	  she	  can	  now	  spend	  roughly	  double	  the	  previous	  limit.	  	  Though	  she	  argues	  the	  necessity	  of	  paying	  down	  debt,	  she	  has	  used	  her	  autonomy	  over	  the	  Central	  Bank	  to	  spend	  federal	  reserves	  on	  the	  welfare	  of	  her	  constituency	  (O’Grady	  2012).	  	  	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  columnist	  Mary	  Anastasia	  O’Grady	  described	  Kirchner’s	  policy	  as	  manipulation	  and	  hinted	  at	  political	  business	  cycle	  theory	  when	  she	  stated,	  “The	  state	  creates	  the	  conditions	  for	  crisis.	  Crisis	  strikes.	  Politicians	  seize	  extraordinary	  powers.	  Crisis	  passes.	  Left	  behind	  is	  a	  popular	  perception	  that	  complete	  annihilation	  was	  averted	  due	  to	  government	  genius,”	  (O’Grady	  2012).	  	  This	  manipulation	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank	  involves	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  well.	  	  	  The	  Argentine	  economy	  has	  been	  distinctly	  cash-­‐based	  since	  the	  2001	  economic	  crash	  and	  subsequent	  instability.	  	  Naturally,	  citizens	  prefer	  liquid	  assets,	  usually	  in	  pesos	  or,	  preferably,	  US	  dollars,	  after	  many	  of	  their	  bank-­‐held	  securities	  underwent	  extreme	  devaluation	  by	  government	  mandate.	  	  In	  2010,	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  initiated	  certain	  measures	  to	  encourage	  citizens	  to	  rid	  themselves	  of	  hoards	  of	  cash	  stored	  in	  secret.	  	  In	  September,	  banks	  began	  to	  offer	  cost-­‐free	  savings	  and	  checking	  accounts	  in	  hopes	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  bank	  customers.	  	  Further,	  banks	  reduced	  electronic	  banking	  transaction	  costs	  to	  ease	  the	  use	  of	  non-­‐cash	  transactions.	  	  Although	  the	  government	  has	  made	  strides	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  a	  cash-­‐based	  market,	  accomplishing	  this	  in	  full	  will	  be	  a	  challenge	  considering	  most	  real	  estate	  deals	  are	  still	  transacted	  in	  cash.	  	  These	  efforts	  caused	  a	  bit	  of	  controversy	  when,	  in	  2010,	  Kirchner	  challenged	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank	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by	  paying	  off	  external	  debt	  with	  Argentine	  reserves.	  	  When	  BCRA	  president	  refused	  the	  government	  mandate,	  he	  was	  replaced.	  	  The	  new	  Central	  Bank	  president	  has	  alleviated	  tension	  with	  the	  national	  government	  by	  continuing	  to	  relax	  monetary	  policy	  and	  support	  spending	  on	  debt	  payments.	  	  The	  Kirchner	  regime	  interprets	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank	  differently	  than	  in	  the	  past	  and	  has	  proposed	  to	  add	  the	  “promotion	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  job	  creation	  to	  its	  core	  function	  of	  preserving	  the	  value	  of	  the	  currency,”	  (“Financing”	  2010).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  despite	  these	  efforts,	  little	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  to	  stabilize	  the	  value	  of	  the	  currency,	  and	  official	  inflation	  statistics	  are	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  inaccurate.	  	  Government	  statistics	  show	  an	  increasing	  inflation	  rate,	  but	  the	  acceleration	  at	  which	  the	  inflation	  rate	  is	  increasing	  has	  been	  discredited	  by	  private	  analysts	  (“Financing”	  2010).	  	  Kirchner	  has	  worsened	  problems	  by	  showing	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  increasing	  level	  of	  distrust	  among	  Argentine	  citizens	  towards	  her.	  Argentina	  did	  not	  react	  strongly	  when	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  their	  government	  was	  doctoring	  inflation	  rates	  early	  in	  the	  Kirchner	  regime	  in	  2007,	  but	  in	  2010,	  inflation-­‐linked	  bondholders	  lost	  at	  least	  $2.3	  billion	  due	  to	  incorrect	  numbers	  (“Lies”	  2011).	  	  Accurate	  rates	  have	  not	  been	  hard	  to	  find	  since	  a	  plethora	  of	  private	  economists	  have	  hosted	  their	  own	  surveys	  and	  released	  more	  accurate	  statistics.	  	  In	  2011	  when	  “Lies	  and	  Argentine	  Statistics”	  was	  published	  in	  The	  
Economist,	  private	  analysts	  estimated	  that	  inflation	  was	  about	  25%,	  compared	  to	  a	  government-­‐reported	  10%	  (“Lies”	  2011).	  	  The	  article	  discusses	  a	  looming	  presidential	  election	  that,	  although	  Kirchner	  won,	  could	  have	  been	  threatened	  by	  private	  economists’	  published	  inflation	  rates.	  	  Leading	  up	  to	  reelection,	  this	  
	  	   39	  
situation	  was	  managed	  relatively	  undemocratically	  in	  light	  of	  how	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Commerce	  addressed	  private	  economists.	  	  The	  article	  states:	  “That	  may	  be	  why	  Guillermo	  Moreno,	  the	  thuggish	  commerce	  secretary,	  is	  moving	  to	  stamp	  out	  the	  unofficial,	  but	  widely	  trusted,	  price	  indices.	  To	  do	  so	  he	  has	  dusted	  off	  a	  decree,	  penalizing	  misleading	  advertising,	  approved	  by	  a	  military	  dictatorship	  in	  1983.	  In	  February	  he	  sent	  letters	  to	  12	  economists	  and	  consultants	  ordering	  them	  to	  reveal	  their	  methodology,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  erroneous	  figures	  could	  mislead	  consumers,”	  (“Lies”	  2011).	  The	  situation	  has	  considerably	  worsened	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  	  Inflation	  has	  grown,	  and	  the	  government	  continues	  to	  publish	  inaccurate	  numbers.	  	  The	  graph	  below	  	  shows	  the	  price	  gap,	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  official	  and	  unofficial	  estimations	  of	  the	  percent	  increase	  of	  consumer	  prices	  (“Still	  Lying”	  2013).	  	  This	  displays	  that	  the	  inflation	  rate	  is	  at	  least	  double	  the	  government	  published	  rate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  8.	  Price	  Gap	  (2006-­‐12)	  (“Argentina’s	  Debt	  Restructuring”	  2014)	  	   These	  inaccuracies	  have	  cost	  the	  government	  more	  than	  just	  its	  credibility.	  	  When	  official	  statistics	  claimed	  that	  construction	  expanded	  by	  4.7%	  in	  2013,	  EconViews,	  a	  private	  firm,	  said	  the	  number	  was	  probably	  closer	  to	  0.5%.	  	  Earlier	  in	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Cristina	  Kirchner’s	  term,	  this	  estimate	  varied	  by	  up	  to	  ten	  percentage	  points.	  	  Although	  the	  gap	  has	  narrowed,	  public	  numbers	  are	  still	  considered	  widely	  unreliable	  (“Still	  Lying”	  2013).	  	  During	  the	  2005	  debt	  restructuring,	  GDP-­‐indexed	  warrants	  were	  put	  in	  place	  so	  that	  if	  GDP	  growth	  exceeded	  certain	  limits,	  government	  payouts	  are	  necessitated.	  	  If	  economic	  growth	  exceeds	  a	  threshold	  of	  around	  3%,	  Argentina	  must	  pay	  holders	  of	  the	  security	  an	  amount	  equivalent	  to	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  baseline	  GDP	  and	  actual	  output	  (“Warranting	  Attention”	  2013).	  	  While	  private	  economists	  suspect	  that	  2014	  GDP	  growth	  will	  be	  about	  2.8%,	  the	  government	  predicts	  a	  growth	  rate	  of	  5.1%,	  or	  nearly	  double	  the	  more	  accurate	  rate.	  	  Though	  the	  gap	  is	  unsurprising,	  the	  $3.5	  billion	  payout	  that	  would	  be	  required	  of	  Kirchner	  seems	  a	  high	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  slightly	  higher	  GDP	  growth	  estimates	  (“Warranting	  Attention”	  2010).	  	  Underestimating	  inflation	  has	  had	  quite	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  official	  GDP	  calculations	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  Cristina	  Kirchner’s	  presidency	  in	  2007.	  	  In	  September	  2013,	  the	  government	  reported	  incredibly	  positive	  growth	  figures	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  payouts.	  	  It	  did	  so	  in	  the	  face	  of	  IMF	  criticism	  that	  could	  potentially	  cause	  its	  removal	  from	  IMF	  support	  (“Still	  lying”	  2013).	  	  The	  graph	  below	  displays	  three	  factors	  manipulated	  by	  government	  statistics:	  	  the	  consumer	  price	  gap,	  GDP	  gap,	  and	  the	  gap	  in	  construction	  activity.	  	  All	  three	  statistical	  differences	  show	  that	  the	  Kirchner	  regime	  uses	  grossly	  inaccurate	  information	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  economic	  analysis	  and	  planning	  (“Still	  Lying”	  2013).	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  Figure	  9.	  Credibility	  Gap	  (2008-­‐12)	  (“Argentina’s	  Debt	  Restructuring”	  2014)	  	  	   Economic	  conditions	  in	  Argentina	  are	  currently	  in	  flux,	  and	  Argentina	  is	  obviously	  experiencing	  rising	  inflation	  and	  high	  interest	  rates.	  	  The	  Kirchner	  policymaking	  regarding	  central	  bank	  reserves	  and	  other	  various	  internal	  financing	  mechanisms	  is	  questionable,	  but	  the	  government	  is	  continuing	  with	  expansionary	  monetary	  policy	  despite	  deteriorating	  account	  balances.	  	  These	  trends	  do	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  Argentina’s	  chances	  of	  repaying	  remaining	  debt,	  especially	  with	  growing	  concern	  over	  capital	  and	  exchange	  rate	  controls	  (Hornbeck	  12).	  	  The	  politics	  play	  into	  PBC	  theory	  as	  Kirchner	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  an	  artificial	  boom	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  her	  2011	  reelection.	  	  Though	  she	  is	  not	  currently	  running	  for	  reelection,	  her	  policymaking	  attempts	  to	  appease	  her	  constituency	  by	  increasing	  government	  spending,	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash,	  and	  widening	  the	  job	  market.	  	  The	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  these	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  increasing	  inflation,	  might	  lead	  to	  recession,	  and	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  near-­‐term	  economy	  will	  in	  turn	  be	  negatively	  affected.	  	  Perhaps	  PBC	  theory	  cannot	  stand	  alone	  to	  explain	  these	  economic	  trends,	  and	  Kirchner’s	  actions	  are	  additionally	  motivated	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  party	  power	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CHAPTER	  VI.	  Data	  Analysis	  and	  Suppositions	  Argentina’s	  economy	  has	  a	  tumultuous	  past,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  two	  major	  crises	  in	  the	  mid	  1980’s	  and	  early	  2000’s.	  	  Though	  relative	  stability	  has	  prevailed	  since	  the	  2001	  crisis,	  Argentina’s	  current	  economic	  position	  appears	  unstable.	  	  The	  nation	  is	  past	  due	  for	  another	  crisis,	  and	  the	  rates	  of	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  are	  on	  the	  rise.	  	  A	  February	  2014	  article	  in	  The	  Economist	  stated:	  “A	  year	  and	  a	  half	  ago	  Argentine	  President	  Cristina	  Fernández	  de	  Kirchner	  insisted	  that	  if	  inflation	  were	  truly	  25%,	  as	  independent	  economists	  reckoned,	  her	  country	  would	  ‘explode	  into	  the	  air.’	  After	  several	  years	  of	  manipulating	  inflation	  statistics	  to	  support	  such	  fibbing,	  it	  seems	  the	  government	  has	  finally	  started	  to	  face	  reality,”	  (“New	  data”	  2014).	  	  	  So,	  will	  Argentina	  face	  economic	  turmoil	  in	  2014	  as	  many	  analysts	  suspect?	  	  	  On	  the	  brink	  of	  another	  economic	  recession,	  the	  February	  2014	  issue	  of	  The	  
Economist	  featured	  a	  story	  entitled	  “The	  Parable	  of	  Argentina,”	  instructing	  countries	  with	  emerging	  economies	  how	  not	  to	  turn	  out	  like	  Argentina.	  	  The	  article	  states,	  “The	  lesson	  from	  the	  parable	  of	  Argentina	  is	  that	  good	  government	  matters.	  Perhaps	  it	  has	  been	  learned.	  But	  the	  chances	  are	  that	  in	  100	  years’	  time	  the	  world	  will	  look	  back	  at	  another	  Argentina—a	  country	  of	  the	  future	  that	  got	  stuck	  in	  the	  past,”	  (“The	  parable	  of	  Argentina”	  2014).	  	  This	  article	  outlines	  the	  many	  ways	  the	  Argentine	  government	  has	  failed	  its	  economy	  since	  1914,	  highlighting	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  Peronist	  rule	  on	  future	  international	  trade	  and	  self-­‐sustaining	  liberal	  economic	  policy.	  	  Since	  2011,	  Cristina	  Kirchner’s	  regime	  has	  done	  nothing	  to	  reverse	  the	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effects	  of	  economic	  demise	  but	  rather	  has	  perpetuated	  the	  cycle	  of	  economic	  strife	  created	  by	  her	  predecessors.	  	  	  
A.	  Economic	  trends	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2014	  The	  present	  economic	  reality	  for	  Argentina	  is	  far	  beyond	  the	  reaches	  of	  Kirchner’s	  broad	  and	  incorrect	  previous	  statements,	  with	  a	  new	  IMF-­‐developed	  consumer	  price	  index	  putting	  January	  2014	  inflation	  at	  3.7%.	  	  If	  inflation	  continues	  at	  this	  January	  rate,	  2014	  annual	  inflation	  would	  compound	  to	  be	  55%,	  drastically	  outranking	  every	  other	  Latin	  American	  nation	  except	  Venezuela,	  but	  private	  economists	  estimate	  rates	  still	  higher	  than	  this.	  	  The	  discrepancy	  between	  inflation	  rates	  and	  government	  wage	  increases	  capped	  at	  25%	  for	  the	  year	  is	  glaring.	  	  Police	  officers	  already	  went	  on	  strike	  for	  higher	  wages	  for	  most	  of	  December	  2013,	  resulting	  in	  violence	  throughout	  the	  provinces.	  	  Their	  demands	  forced	  wage	  increases	  of	  30%,	  causing	  government	  spending	  to	  soar.	  	  To	  cover	  these	  costs,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  proceeded	  to	  print	  new	  money,	  presenting	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  peso.	  	  If	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2014	  is	  just	  as	  extreme	  as	  expected,	  the	  government	  is	  risking	  social	  chaos	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  civic	  employees.	  	  	  Others	  are	  affected	  as	  well	  since	  the	  inflation	  estimates	  will	  affect	  poverty	  and	  indigence	  statistics.	  	  Those	  unable	  to	  afford	  basic	  goods	  and	  services	  ranging	  from	  food	  to	  health	  and	  education	  are	  considered	  below	  the	  poverty	  line,	  and	  those	  unable	  to	  afford	  just	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  basic	  food	  basket	  estimated	  by	  INDEC	  are	  considered	  indigent.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  estimates	  would	  increase	  dramatically	  given	  the	  expected	  inflation	  rate	  for	  2014,	  and	  private	  analyst	  Juan	  Luis	  Bour	  calculated	  the	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respective	  2013	  poverty	  and	  indigence	  rates	  at	  nearly	  double	  and	  triple	  the	  government-­‐published	  rates.	  	  He	  expects	  Kirchner	  will	  stop	  publishing	  the	  basket	  prices	  so	  no	  calculation	  can	  be	  made	  at	  all	  since	  her	  Peronist	  regime	  is	  built	  around	  reducing	  poverty	  and	  championing	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens	  (“New	  data”	  2014).	  	  	  Currently,	  as	  foreign	  currency	  reserves	  dwindle,	  citizens	  exhibit	  a	  mistrust	  of	  the	  peso	  and	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  back	  their	  currency.	  	  	  During	  the	  last	  week	  of	  January	  2014,	  Argentina	  lost	  $1.25	  billion	  in	  foreign	  currency	  reserves	  due	  to	  the	  peso	  devaluation,	  and	  possible	  recession	  is	  once	  again	  endangering	  the	  economy.	  	  Through	  the	  central	  bank,	  Kirchner	  has	  kept	  a	  tight	  hold	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  peso,	  and	  the	  bank	  has	  recently	  defended	  the	  currency	  at	  around	  eight	  pesos	  per	  dollar	  after	  letting	  it	  slide	  15%	  in	  early	  January.	  They	  are	  burning	  through	  dollars	  doing	  so	  by	  paying	  off	  international	  debt,	  and	  reserves	  are	  down	  $2.3	  billion	  this	  year	  after	  dropping	  by	  $4.1	  billion	  in	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  of	  2013.	  After	  peaking	  at	  $52.6	  billion	  in	  January	  2011,	  reserves	  now	  stand	  at	  just	  under	  $28.3	  billion	  (Parks	  2014).	  	  The	  chart	  below	  shows	  the	  drop	  in	  foreign	  reserves	  from	  their	  highest.	  	  The	  amount	  has	  nearly	  been	  cut	  in	  half.
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Figure	  10.	  Foreign	  Reserves	  (2011-­‐4)	  (Parks	  2014)	  
This	  data	  has	  shocked	  Argentines	  into	  hoarding	  dollars	  purchased	  on	  the	  black	  market,	  an	  age-­‐old	  pattern	  exhibited	  by	  untrusting	  Argentine	  citizens.	  	  A	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  article	  published	  January	  30,	  2014,	  states:	  
“The	  devaluation	  has	  so	  far	  failed	  to	  achieve	  what	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  its	  main	  goal:	  to	  close	  the	  confidence-­‐busting	  gap	  between	  the	  official	  and	  black-­‐market	  rates.	  The	  gap	  has	  narrowed	  in	  recent	  weeks.	  	  The	  bigger	  the	  gap	  between	  black-­‐market	  and	  regulated	  rates,	  the	  more	  the	  Argentine	  public	  fears	  the	  official	  exchange	  rate	  is	  overvalued	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  another	  devaluation,”	  (Parks	  2014).	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spiraling	  downward.	  	  	  
The	  Argentine	  tax	  agency	  AFIP	  is	  once	  again	  allowing	  dollar	  purchases	  after	  virtually	  forbidding	  them	  in	  2011.	  	  It	  recently	  reversed	  the	  “clamp”	  Kirchner	  placed	  on	  dollar	  purchases	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  her	  presidency,	  but	  the	  blue	  dollar	  market	  has	  not	  wavered.	  	  Buying	  dollars,	  however	  expensive,	  allows	  Argentines	  peace	  of	  mind	  and	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  purchase	  real	  estate	  or	  travel	  in	  the	  future	  (“Currency	  Controls”	  2014).	  	  Those	  who	  can	  afford	  it	  buy	  real	  estate,	  and	  until	  recently	  when	  a	  punishing	  tax	  was	  introduced,	  they	  bought	  cars	  as	  a	  means	  of	  storing	  value.	  But	  for	  a	  long	  time	  the	  most	  common	  means	  of	  protecting	  savings	  was	  to	  buy	  dollars.	  	  This	  practice	  was	  personally	  helpful,	  but	  also	  drained	  Argentina’s	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves.	  	  After	  losing	  a	  third	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  to	  Argentine	  citizens	  purchasing	  dollars,	  in	  2011	  Kirchner	  placed	  a	  hold	  on	  legal	  dollar	  purchases	  through	  the	  tax	  agency	  AFIP.	  	  Starting	  in	  late	  January	  2014,	  Argentines	  legally	  purchased	  limited	  amounts	  of	  dollars	  for	  savings	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  nearly	  two	  years,	  and	  in	  less	  than	  a	  week,	  AFIP	  authorized	  purchases	  of	  over	  $137	  million.	  	  Instead	  of	  investing	  in	  the	  Argentine	  banking	  system,	  citizens	  who	  made	  withdrawals	  mostly	  chose	  to	  pay	  a	  20%	  tax	  on	  dollars	  in	  order	  to	  invest	  freely	  abroad	  (Parks	  2014).	  	  Though	  the	  opportunity	  to	  purchase	  dollars	  legally	  is	  newly	  available,	  no	  decline	  whatsoever	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  dollar	  black	  market.	  	  As	  of	  February	  2014,	  several	  black-­‐market	  exchange	  houses	  in	  Buenos	  Aires,	  unsure	  of	  what	  the	  next	  week	  might	  bring,	  are	  still	  hungrily	  buying	  and	  selling	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  roughly	  12	  pesos	  to	  the	  dollar,	  well	  above	  the	  official	  rate	  of	  8.1	  (“Currency	  controls”	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2014).	  
B.	  Economic	  policy	  reform:	  	  trade,	  price	  freezes,	  devaluation	  
Despite	  broad	  revisions	  to	  correct	  peso	  devaluation	  and	  the	  consumer	  price	  index,	  Kirchner’s	  efforts	  come	  up	  short.	  	  No	  mention	  has	  yet	  been	  made	  of	  a	  larger	  plan	  for	  changes	  in	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policy.	  Freeing	  up	  the	  currency	  is	  a	  necessary	  step	  to	  stabilize	  the	  economy,	  but	  without	  a	  coordinated	  effort	  to	  rein	  in	  inflation,	  devaluation	  will	  continue	  fuelling	  price	  rises	  and	  further	  falls	  in	  the	  peso	  (“Currency	  controls”	  2014).	  	  In	  February	  2013,	  the	  IMF	  threatened	  Argentina	  with	  suspension	  or	  expulsion	  if	  it	  did	  not	  improve	  the	  accuracy	  of	  published	  statistics.	  	  When	  the	  IMF	  met	  to	  review	  Argentina’s	  progress	  in	  December,	  it	  once	  again	  deferred	  action	  until	  March	  2014,	  claiming	  to	  recognize	  the	  government’s	  ongoing	  work	  in	  improving	  transparency.	  	  Though	  government	  published	  interest	  rates	  are	  on	  the	  rise,	  will	  all	  numbers	  match	  this	  new	  trend?	  	  Some	  say	  no.	  	  “INDEC	  is	  likely	  to	  cherry	  pick	  items	  for	  which	  the	  government	  has	  ordered	  price	  freezes	  and	  leave	  out	  those	  whose	  prices	  rise,	  thinks	  Juan	  Luis	  Bour	  of	  FIEL,	  a	  think-­‐tank	  in	  Buenos	  Aires,”	  (“Still	  Lying”	  2013).	  	  Public	  unease	  is	  higher	  than	  ever	  in	  light	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  published	  and	  actual	  statistics.	  	  Kirchner’s	  “statistical	  solipsism”	  has	  proven	  useless	  in	  light	  of	  the	  December	  2013	  police	  strikes	  that	  crippled	  eleven	  provinces	  and	  resulted	  in	  wage	  increases	  of	  30%	  (“Still	  Lying”	  2013).	  	  Argentines	  know	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  in	  a	  precarious	  state,	  and	  the	  condition	  is	  worsening	  day	  by	  day.	  
The	  United	  States,	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU),	  and	  Japan	  filed	  cases	  against	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Argentina	  in	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  in	  December	  2013	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  repealing	  of	  licensing	  policies	  regarding	  foreign	  entities	  in	  Argentina.	  	  Even	  so,	  import	  restrictions	  meant	  to	  facilitate	  national	  production	  are	  non-­‐coded	  and	  arbitrary,	  causing	  strife	  with	  Argentina’s	  profitable	  trading	  partners	  (Hornbeck	  17).	  	  Although	  the	  government	  lifted	  licensing	  restraints,	  it	  raised	  tariffs	  exponentially	  to	  35%	  on	  over	  100	  products.	  	  Further,	  Argentina	  lashed	  out	  at	  the	  WTO	  ruling	  by	  raising	  complaints	  on	  US	  restrictions	  to	  Argentine	  beef	  imports.	  	  Any	  chance	  of	  increased	  exports	  and	  a	  more	  profitable	  trade	  sector	  has	  now	  significantly	  diminished	  due	  to	  unfavorable	  WTO	  rulings	  and	  ineffective	  export	  and	  production	  policies	  (Hornbeck	  16).	  	  JF	  Hornbeck,	  an	  international	  trade	  and	  finance	  specialist,	  stated	  “Argentina’s	  trade	  policies	  have	  brought	  retaliation	  from	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  In	  April	  2012,	  40	  members	  of	  the	  WTO,	  including	  the	  United	  States,	  denounced	  Argentina	  at	  a	  WTO	  meeting	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  protectionist	  practices.	  In	  May	  2012,the	  EU	  took	  the	  next	  step	  and	  filed	  a	  suit	  against	  Argentina	  in	  the	  WTO	  over	  its	  import	  restrictions	  for	  being	  inconsistent	  with	  international	  trade	  rules,”	  (Hornbeck	  15).	  	  He	  condemns	  Argentina	  in	  his	  study	  on	  Argentine	  trade	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  hints	  that	  large-­‐scale	  export	  profitability	  is	  in	  danger.	  	  Argentina	  tops	  the	  Global	  Trade	  Alert	  list	  of	  offensive	  nations	  with	  regards	  to	  discriminatory	  measures,	  tariff	  lines,	  sectors	  affected,	  and	  trading	  partners	  involved	  (Hornbeck	  16).	  	  In	  Argentina’s	  case,	  policy	  choices	  have	  introduced	  major	  distortions	  in	  the	  economy	  that	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  financial	  crisis.	  Foreign	  currency	  accounts	  are	  dwindling,	  and	  Hornbeck	  asserts	  that	  policy	  adjustments	  put	  in	  place	  by	  Kirchner	  cannot	  accommodate	  current	  account	  deficits	  or	  problems	  with	  the	  market	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exchange	  rate.	  	  Argentina	  does	  not	  have	  a	  constrained	  economic	  system,	  but	  policymakers	  act	  as	  if	  it	  does	  (Hornbeck	  18).	  	  	  Though	  many	  individuals	  within	  a	  democracy	  are	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  long-­‐term	  investment,	  politicians	  rarely	  do	  the	  same.	  	  If	  pursued	  to	  excess,	  Kirchner’s	  economic	  policies	  can	  have	  unfortunate	  long-­‐term	  consequences.	  	  These	  consequences	  include	  inflation,	  a	  low	  rate	  of	  savings,	  damage	  to	  the	  trade	  balance,	  and	  job	  loss.	  	  Kirchner	  was	  easily	  reelected	  with	  the	  use	  of	  such	  economic	  policy,	  and	  she	  has	  continued	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  same	  PBC	  policies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  an	  artificial	  boom	  for	  the	  last	  several	  years.	  	  Therefore,	  these	  effects	  have	  continually	  increased	  as	  time	  has	  passed.	  	  Although	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  was	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse,	  Kirchner	  proceeded	  with	  policies	  that	  emphasized	  social	  spending	  and	  increasingly	  subsidized	  energy	  and	  transportation.	  	  Through	  her	  handle	  on	  the	  central	  bank,	  she	  continued	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  and	  indirectly	  causing	  a	  rise	  in	  inflation	  rates	  to	  nearly	  30%	  in	  January	  and	  February	  2014.	  	  Figure	  11	  below	  was	  published	  by	  FIEL,	  an	  Argentine	  think	  tank	  that	  performs	  statistical	  analyses	  and	  reports	  contradicting	  inflation	  rates	  than	  official	  INDEC	  rates.	  	  Here,	  the	  orange	  FIEL	  rate	  contrasts	  the	  blue	  INDEC	  rate,	  displaying	  an	  obvious	  discrepancy	  between	  official	  and	  actual	  inflation.	  	  Even	  with	  the	  recent	  IMF-­‐backed	  policy	  changes	  to	  correct	  INDEC	  statistics,	  the	  FIEL	  rate	  is	  still	  significantly	  higher	  (State	  Street	  2014).
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Figure	  11.	  Actual	  versus	  Official	  Inflation	  Rate	  (2007-­‐13)	  (State	  Street	  2014)	  
	  	  	  	   To	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  a	  flourishing	  economy	  post	  reelection	  in	  2011,	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  created	  policy	  to	  freeze	  price	  increases	  and	  expand	  welfare	  benefits	  and	  pensions	  for	  government	  dependents	  (“Flying	  Solo”	  2011).	  	  She	  even	  gave	  government	  employees	  raises	  of	  up	  to	  30%	  (“Lies	  and	  Statistics”	  2011).	  	  Her	  practices	  to	  win	  over	  votes	  and	  appease	  her	  constituency	  have	  negatively	  affected	  the	  present	  economic	  state.	  	  Kirchner	  exercises	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  control	  over	  the	  Central	  Bank,	  and	  she	  has	  continued	  to	  let	  inflation	  climb	  by	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash.	  	  The	  charter	  of	  the	  Argentine	  central	  bank	  (BCRA)	  has	  undergone	  many	  revisions	  during	  the	  Kirchner	  regime	  that	  threaten	  its	  autonomy,	  but	  section	  four	  still	  purports	  that	  "in	  carrying	  out	  its	  functions	  and	  powers,	  the	  Bank	  shall	  neither	  be	  subject	  to	  any	  order,	  indication,	  or	  instruction	  from	  the	  National	  Executive.”	  	  However,	  the	  Argentine	  government	  has	  struggled	  for	  credibility	  in	  its	  argument	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  country's	  central	  bank	  after	  going	  through	  seven	  governors	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since	  2001.	  The	  removal	  of	  the	  previous	  governor	  for	  refusing	  to	  transfer	  funds	  accumulated	  in	  international	  reserves	  over	  to	  the	  government	  to	  be	  used	  for	  debt	  payments,	  does	  not	  suggest	  much	  independence	  (Levy	  2013).	  	  	  The	  central	  bank	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  under	  direct	  control	  of	  executive	  powers,	  especially	  since	  Kirchner	  appointed	  a	  close	  political	  ally	  as	  central	  bank	  governor	  after	  removing	  the	  last	  one.	  	  Her	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  the	  economy	  has	  led	  to	  present	  day	  excessive	  inflation	  of	  over	  30%.	  	  While	  these	  numbers	  climb,	  wage	  increases	  for	  government	  employees	  are	  now	  capped	  at	  25%	  (“New	  Data”	  2014).	  	  Although	  wage	  caps	  might	  help	  to	  control	  government	  spending,	  these	  policies	  could	  be	  devastating	  to	  average	  citizens.	  	  	  
C.	  Economic	  theory	  in	  the	  2001	  crisis	  versus	  today	  
The	  current	  exchange	  rate	  is	  not	  pegged,	  providing	  autonomy	  that	  was	  nonexistent	  during	  Menem’s	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  regime,	  but	  Kirchner	  has	  a	  tight	  hold	  on	  many	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  Menem	  operated	  under	  an	  economic	  plan	  that	  violated	  the	  Mundell-­‐Fleming	  model,	  which	  states	  that	  no	  nation’s	  economy	  can	  succeed	  with	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	  free	  capital	  flow,	  and	  sovereign	  monetary	  policy.	  	  After	  reversing	  the	  Convertibility	  Law	  in	  1999,	  Argentina	  was	  doomed	  for	  crisis	  that	  came	  two	  years	  later	  in	  2001.	  	  Relative	  to	  the	  era	  of	  convertibility,	  the	  peso	  is	  freely	  floating,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  exactly	  part	  of	  a	  capital	  market.	  	  Now	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  is	  partially	  determined	  by	  currency	  controls	  to	  maintain	  an	  exchange	  rate	  within	  a	  band	  set	  by	  Kirchner,	  and	  inflation	  is	  so	  exorbitant	  that	  Kirchner	  has	  forced	  price	  freezes	  on	  many	  goods.	  	  The	  Central	  Bank	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is	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  executive,	  and	  Kirchner	  has	  been	  able	  to	  manipulate	  the	  economy	  by	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  and	  determining	  interest	  rates.	  	  She	  has	  even	  enacted	  laws	  to	  prevent	  free	  capital	  flow,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  agricultural	  exports.	  	  Though	  the	  economic	  practices	  of	  Menem	  and	  Kirchner	  oppose	  one	  another	  and	  their	  policies	  bear	  no	  resemblance,	  they	  are	  alike	  in	  one	  fundamental	  way.	  	  Both	  regimes	  function	  under	  strict	  executive	  manipulation,	  and	  both	  have	  produced	  similarly	  negative	  results.	  	  Though	  Kirchner	  reversed	  the	  privatizations	  enacted	  under	  Menem,	  both	  regimes	  have	  produced	  growing	  unemployment	  rates.	  	  Inflation	  is	  a	  chronic	  problem	  for	  Argentina	  due	  to	  regimes	  that	  have	  overvalued	  the	  peso	  while	  maintaining	  liberal	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policy,	  and	  Argentines	  have	  such	  little	  faith	  in	  their	  currency	  that	  they	  hoard	  US	  dollars	  in	  preparation	  for	  another	  economic	  crisis.	  	  This	  action	  is	  most	  likely	  spurred	  on	  by	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  2001	  crisis	  when	  dollar	  deposits	  were	  swapped	  for	  devalued	  pesos.	  	  
Neither	  Menem	  nor	  Kirchner	  has	  acted	  particularly	  wisely	  with	  regards	  to	  economic	  policymaking,	  and	  both	  have	  sought	  personal	  gain	  in	  trying	  to	  enact	  legislation	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  run	  for	  reelection.	  	  Kirchner	  only	  perpetuated	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  2001	  debt	  default	  created	  by	  Menem	  with	  excessive	  spending	  and	  an	  overinflated	  currency.	  	  The	  atmosphere	  surrounding	  the	  economy	  in	  Argentina	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  2001	  crisis.	  Citizens	  have	  a	  well-­‐deserved	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  executive	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  many	  hesitate	  to	  make	  risky	  investments	  in	  Argentina.	  	  Cristina	  Kirchner	  has	  exhibited	  policymaking	  in	  line	  with	  political	  business	  cycle	  theory	  like	  emphasizing	  social	  spending	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  inflation	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and	  unemployment,	  and	  her	  skewed	  motives	  have	  left	  Argentina	  in	  need	  of	  repair.	  	  Though	  all	  politicians	  seek	  reelection,	  Kirchner	  has	  won	  votes	  by	  overzealously	  manipulating	  the	  economy.	  	  There	  is	  no	  viable	  opposition	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  counteractive	  political	  party	  to	  fight	  her	  on	  policymaking,	  and	  she	  has	  gradually	  seized	  more	  power	  by	  manipulating	  her	  control	  over	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policy,	  especially	  through	  her	  nominations	  for	  Central	  Bank	  officials.	  
D.	  What	  happens	  next?	  
	   To	  prevent	  outright	  crisis,	  Argentina	  must	  ensure	  that	  foreign	  currency	  reserves	  do	  not	  dry	  up	  entirely.	  	  One	  way	  to	  propagate	  growth	  and	  stability	  is	  to	  have	  a	  good	  2014	  harvest,	  since	  agriculture	  is	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  income	  in	  dollars	  making	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  $10	  billion	  in	  exports	  in	  2013.	  	  Government	  interventions	  have	  devastated	  wheat	  exports,	  Argentina’s	  primary	  agricultural	  product	  and	  largest	  source	  of	  income	  (“Tensions	  in	  Argentina”	  2013).	  	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  Argentina	  was	  the	  world’s	  fourth	  largest	  exporter	  of	  wheat	  in	  2006,	  but	  dropped	  to	  tenth	  place	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  Wheat	  exports	  have	  plummeted	  from	  16	  m	  tons	  in	  2005	  to	  8.2	  m	  tons	  in	  2013,	  and	  Argentina	  is	  risking	  the	  loss	  of	  significant	  global	  trading	  partners.	  	  Brazil	  was	  forced	  to	  import	  wheat	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Uruguay	  when	  export	  bans	  prevented	  Argentina	  from	  supplying	  a	  sufficient	  amount,	  and	  Argentina	  was	  forced	  to	  default	  on	  January	  contracts	  with	  Brazil	  when	  the	  government	  did	  not	  lift	  the	  ban.	  	  Similar	  policies	  have	  destroyed	  Argentina’s	  beef	  industry,	  and	  the	  country	  dropped	  from	  the	  third	  largest	  exporter	  of	  beef	  in	  2005	  to	  eleventh	  place	  last	  year	  (“Argentina’s	  Wheat	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Export”	  2014).	  	  The	  agricultural	  industry	  that	  once	  kept	  Argentina	  afloat	  has	  plummeted	  into	  the	  abyss.	  	  Though	  this	  can	  be	  partially	  blamed	  on	  seasonal	  weather,	  policymakers	  made	  a	  conscious	  choice	  to	  limit	  industry	  regrowth	  and	  limit	  export	  levels.	  	  With	  a	  rise	  in	  inflation,	  the	  government	  has	  been	  forced	  to	  negotiate	  price	  freezes	  on	  193	  common	  goods	  in	  order	  to	  help	  citizens.	  	  In	  December	  2013,	  the	  year-­‐end	  trade	  surplus	  was	  $272	  million,	  falling	  $1.5	  billion	  short	  of	  the	  budgeted	  target.	  	  The	  fall	  translated	  to	  a	  67%	  decrease	  compared	  to	  the	  trade	  surplus	  in	  December	  2012.	  	  The	  lagging	  trade	  surplus	  has	  been	  a	  major	  contributor	  to	  the	  dollar	  shortage	  that	  is	  driving	  inflation	  through	  the	  roof	  (“Trade	  surplus”	  2014).	  	  Although	  the	  country	  is	  not	  in	  outright	  crisis,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  being	  stable.	  	  	  
Refusing	  to	  acknowledge	  economic	  distress	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  option	  for	  Kirchner.	  	  INDEC	  is	  publishing	  more	  accurate	  inflation	  rates	  and	  poverty	  ratings	  show	  that	  Argentines	  cannot	  keep	  up	  mounting	  economic	  pressures	  from	  unsound	  policy.	  	  Macroeconomic	  conditions	  are	  harmful	  to	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  as	  well.	  	  As	  inflation	  rises,	  the	  peso	  is	  gradually	  devalued.	  	  Individual	  citizens	  are	  suffering	  from	  the	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  rising	  price	  index	  and	  caps	  on	  wage	  increases.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  aggregate	  poverty	  levels	  will	  continue	  to	  grow,	  and	  citizens	  will	  display	  mistrust	  of	  government	  officials,	  economic	  policy,	  and	  Argentine	  currency	  in	  particular	  (“New	  Data”	  2014).	  	  Argentina	  has	  increasingly	  less	  purchasing	  power	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  foreign	  reserves,	  and	  foreign	  currency	  levels	  are	  continually	  dropping	  to	  alarmingly	  low	  rates.	  	  This	  is	  a	  product	  of	  government	  spending	  and	  the	  repayment	  of	  outstanding	  debt	  from	  the	  2001	  crisis	  and	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subsequent	  restructuring	  (Parks	  2014).	  	  In	  fear	  of	  approaching	  recession,	  citizens	  are	  withdrawing	  savings	  and	  hoarding	  dollars,	  perpetuating	  the	  drop	  in	  foreign	  account	  balances.	  	  Without	  increased	  exports	  and	  a	  better	  balance	  of	  trade,	  Argentina	  has	  little	  hope	  of	  pulling	  its	  economy	  out	  of	  this	  pattern	  (“Argentina’s	  Wheat	  Exports”	  2014).	  	  	  
	   Capital	  flight	  from	  emerging	  markets	  has	  shaped	  the	  global	  economy	  in	  early	  2014.	  	  The	  “emerging	  market	  crisis”	  threatened	  demise	  for	  many	  countries	  like	  Argentina,	  but	  as	  of	  February	  2014,	  most	  emerging	  market	  economies	  are	  stabilizing.	  	  Though	  many	  will	  survive	  the	  potential	  crisis,	  will	  Argentina?	  	  The	  significant	  debt	  remaining	  from	  2001	  coupled	  with	  increasing	  inflation,	  unemployment,	  and	  capital	  flight	  could	  cause	  a	  negative	  reaction	  in	  Argentina	  because	  they	  are	  crippled	  with	  instability.	  	  According	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Latin	  America,	  Argentina	  will	  not	  enter	  recession	  in	  2014	  but	  will	  continue	  to	  battle	  financial	  volatility	  and	  ongoing	  poor	  policymaking.	  	  This	  cannot	  be	  said	  with	  certainty,	  but	  in	  2015,	  Argentina	  will	  be	  responsible	  to	  pay	  $5.9	  billion	  of	  local-­‐law	  bonds.	  	  
The	  government’s	  current	  mechanism	  of	  currency	  devaluation	  could	  very	  well	  put	  inflation	  above	  40%	  long	  before	  the	  end	  of	  2014,	  according	  to	  Merrill	  Lynch	  analysts	  Marcos	  Buscaglia	  and	  Jane	  Brauer,	  who	  write,	  “This	  would	  decrease	  Argentina’s	  payment	  capacity,	  not	  improve	  it,	  and	  would	  therefore	  put	  the	  [2015	  bond]	  payment	  more	  in	  danger,”	  (Farzad	  2014).	  	  	  Current	  foreign	  reserve	  accounts	  stand	  at	  $28.3	  billion	  and	  are	  constantly	  decreasing.	  	  They	  are	  expected	  to	  continue	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falling,	  and	  the	  already	  low	  balance	  is	  a	  potential	  threat	  for	  a	  run	  on	  banks	  (Parks	  2014).	  	  As	  time	  passes,	  Argentina’s	  likelihood	  of	  default	  grows,	  and	  little	  is	  being	  done	  to	  combat	  economic	  stagnation.	  	  Argentina’s	  disregard	  for	  its	  perception	  in	  world	  markets	  has	  long	  been	  obvious,	  but	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  understand	  what	  they	  are	  “setting	  their	  people	  and	  infrastructure	  up	  for,”	  (Farzad	  2014).	  	  Business	  growth	  and	  capital	  formation	  is	  nonexistent	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  as	  money	  flees	  and	  stability	  disappears.	  	  “The	  situation	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  serious.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  see	  them	  default	  in	  this	  environment,	  it	  would	  have	  global	  repercussions.	  While	  the	  world	  is	  very	  different	  than	  it	  was	  in	  2001,	  I	  don’t	  think	  other	  economies	  will	  escape	  without	  damage,”	  (Farzad	  2014).	  
	   Though	  a	  2014	  recession	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  with	  certainty,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  by	  2015,	  debt	  default	  and	  capital	  flight	  will	  produce	  an	  economic	  downturn.	  	  Although	  real	  GDP	  growth	  is	  predicted	  for	  the	  upcoming	  year,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  on	  the	  decline.	  	  Combined	  with	  trending	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  rates,	  the	  near	  term	  future	  of	  macroeconomic	  conditions	  in	  Argentina	  is	  bleak.	  	  Argentine	  citizens	  feel	  similarly,	  and	  their	  inclination	  to	  withdraw	  foreign	  currency	  held	  in	  Argentine	  banks	  is	  indicative	  of	  their	  mistrust	  of	  the	  government.	  	  	  If	  this	  trend	  continues,	  the	  chance	  for	  a	  default	  in	  2015	  is	  significant,	  and	  these	  decade-­‐old	  unpaid	  debts	  will	  almost	  certainly	  place	  an	  unbearable	  strain	  on	  the	  Argentine	  economy.	  	  As	  economic	  and	  social	  unrest	  grow,	  the	  nation	  is	  bound	  towards	  another	  crippling	  recession,	  and	  outright	  crisis	  is	  not	  out	  of	  the	  question.	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CHAPTER	  VII.	  Conclusion	  
This	  thesis	  set	  out	  to	  answer	  a	  question	  regarding	  the	  near-­‐term	  economic	  state	  of	  Argentina,	  thus	  making	  an	  informed	  attempt	  to	  predict	  the	  future.	  	  By	  analyzing	  global	  economic	  factors	  and	  Argentina’s	  internal	  economic	  policy	  of	  the	  last	  decade,	  I	  attempted	  to	  answer	  this	  question:	  	  What	  is	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  in	  the	  current	  political	  climate?	  	  By	  comparing	  the	  current	  global	  economy	  to	  that	  of	  the	  late	  1990’s	  and	  early	  2000’s	  to	  determine	  congruent	  factors,	  I	  generated	  a	  short-­‐term	  macroeconomic	  prediction.	  	  Further,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  current	  political	  climate	  created	  by	  Kirchner’s	  presidency,	  I	  analyzed	  the	  near-­‐term	  future	  of	  politics	  for	  Argentina	  and	  how	  the	  present	  economic	  state	  might	  affect	  the	  nature	  of	  Argentine	  politics.	  	  	  I	  asserted	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  Political	  Business	  Cycle	  proposed	  by	  William	  Nordhaus	  in	  1971	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  Argentina’s	  past	  boom	  and	  bust	  cycle	  and	  may	  indicate	  the	  motivations	  of	  Kirchner’s	  policymaking	  since	  2007.	  	  Nordhaus	  suggested	  that	  politicians	  spend	  conservatively	  towards	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  term	  and	  abandon	  austerity	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  a	  term	  when	  running	  for	  reelection.	  	  Kirchner’s	  actions	  that	  coincide	  with	  PBC	  theory	  include	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  to	  generate	  jobs	  and	  lower	  unemployment,	  spending	  on	  social	  interests,	  and	  cutting	  taxes.	  	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  interest	  rates	  and	  unemployment	  almost	  always	  fall,	  but	  recession	  looms	  large	  in	  the	  long	  term	  (Nordhaus	  1971).	  	  PBC	  behavior	  has	  been	  evident	  throughout	  Kirchner’s	  presidency,	  especially	  prior	  to	  her	  2011	  reelection.	  	  Subsequently,	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  increased	  significantly	  and	  have	  been	  on	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the	  rise	  since.	  	  This	  was	  fueled	  by	  Kirchner’s	  attempt	  to	  create	  an	  artificial	  boom	  after	  winning	  reelection	  by	  continuing	  with	  social	  spending	  and	  tax	  cuts.	  	  Her	  Peronist	  constituency	  is	  primarily	  urban	  lower	  class,	  and	  the	  negative	  results	  of	  her	  strategic	  attempts	  to	  appease	  voters	  are	  manifesting	  themselves	  now	  in	  high	  inflation	  and	  unemployment	  rates.	  	  Her	  attempts	  to	  mend	  the	  economy	  by	  limiting	  dollar	  sales	  and	  prohibiting	  unlimited	  agricultural	  exports	  are	  failing,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  dwindling	  foreign	  currency	  reserves	  and	  significant	  peso	  devaluation	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2014.	  	  The	  PBC	  theory’s	  prominence	  in	  Argentina	  compared	  to	  regional	  countries	  is	  significant.	  That	  Argentina	  undergoes	  economic	  crisis	  approximately	  once	  a	  decade	  is	  a	  widely	  accepted	  fact	  for	  its	  citizens.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  nation	  is	  overdue	  for	  a	  crisis,	  and	  Argentines	  are	  withdrawing	  savings	  in	  dollar	  denominations	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  crash.	  	  As	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  run	  on	  banks	  and	  another	  debt	  default	  looms	  large	  in	  2015.	  	  Just	  last	  year,	  President	  Kirchner	  herself	  stated	  that	  the	  nation	  would	  “explode	  into	  the	  air,”	  given	  inflation	  rates	  as	  high	  as	  private	  economists	  estimated.	  	  Actual	  inflation	  rates	  were	  in	  fact	  equal	  to	  the	  25%	  estimated	  private	  analysts	  and	  have	  been	  rising	  since.	  	  Kirchner’s	  regime	  intentionally	  falsified	  published	  data	  for	  an	  extended	  amount	  of	  time,	  and	  many	  Argentines	  have	  ignored	  their	  President’s	  antics	  for	  years.	  	  Now,	  though,	  their	  obvious	  mistrust	  and	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  Argentina’s	  executive	  could	  accelerate	  the	  rate	  of	  deterioration	  of	  the	  country’s	  weak	  economy.	  	  If	  Argentines	  proceed	  to	  withdraw	  and	  send	  their	  savings	  out	  of	  the	  country	  for	  safekeeping,	  banks	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  insure	  credit	  and	  will	  default	  on	  citizens’	  deposits.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  citizens	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continue	  hoarding	  US	  dollars,	  Argentine	  foreign	  reserves	  will	  dwindle,	  and	  the	  nation	  will	  default	  on	  its	  2015	  debt	  repayment.	  	  	  I	  predict	  that	  Kirchner	  will	  proceed	  with	  economic	  policymaking	  consistent	  with	  that	  of	  her	  presidential	  term	  thus	  far.	  	  This	  means	  a	  continuation	  of	  limiting	  agricultural	  exports	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  motivate	  internal	  production	  and	  boost	  the	  economy.	  	  The	  implications	  of	  protectionist	  policies	  are	  negative	  in	  practice,	  evidenced	  by	  40	  WTO	  member	  nations	  renouncing	  Argentina	  in	  a	  recent	  meeting.	  Argentina	  is	  guilty	  in	  terms	  of	  discriminatory	  measures,	  tariff	  lines,	  sectors	  affected,	  and	  trading	  partners	  involved,	  and	  their	  balance	  of	  trade	  is	  severely	  skewed.	  	  More	  than	  likely,	  exporters	  will	  default	  on	  contracts	  with	  other	  nations,	  and	  Argentina’s	  debt	  will	  grow	  as	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  continue	  to	  drop.	  	  Although	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  was	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse	  when	  Kirchner	  was	  reelected	  in	  2011,	  she	  proceeded	  with	  social	  spending.	  	  This	  may	  come	  to	  halt	  as	  reserves	  dwindle,	  especially	  since	  she	  placed	  a	  25%	  cap	  on	  wage	  increases	  for	  government	  employees.	  	  Other	  policies	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  cease,	  though,	  and	  she	  has	  chronically	  displayed	  liberal	  spending	  tendencies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  strife.	  	  Through	  her	  handle	  on	  the	  central	  bank,	  she	  has	  flooded	  the	  market	  with	  cash,	  contributing	  to	  a	  rise	  in	  inflation	  rates	  to	  nearly	  30%	  in	  January	  and	  February	  2014.	  	  This,	  too,	  is	  unlikely	  to	  halt.	  	  Her	  success	  in	  overtaking	  the	  Central	  Bank	  has	  enabled	  her	  to	  take	  control	  over	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  produced	  and	  put	  into	  the	  economy.	  	  Therefore,	  if	  she	  follows	  her	  standard	  policymaking	  patterns,	  Kirchner	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  printing	  pesos	  to	  pay	  off	  debts	  and	  perhaps	  stimulate	  
	  	   61	  
the	  economy.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  are	  great;	  inflation	  will	  continue	  climbing	  and	  the	  Argentine	  peso	  will	  lose	  substantial	  value.	  	  	  	   If	  policymaking	  proceeds	  as	  I	  have	  predicted,	  economic	  recession	  should	  occur	  in	  2015.	  	  Given	  ongoing	  protectionist	  trade	  policies,	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  will	  be	  poorly	  skewed,	  and	  Argentine	  citizens	  will	  suffer	  the	  negative	  effects.	  	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  decreasing,	  and	  poverty	  rates	  will	  most	  surely	  go	  up.	  	  Inflation	  created	  by	  flooding	  the	  market	  with	  cash	  will	  be	  substantial	  contributions	  to	  these	  patterns	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  unemployment.	  	  As	  citizen	  mistrust	  of	  the	  government	  leads	  to	  unrest,	  the	  economy	  is	  doomed	  to	  fail	  once	  again.	  	  The	  political	  business	  cycle	  theory	  predicts	  this	  result	  based	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  executive,	  and	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  seems	  to	  follow	  the	  pattern	  given	  by	  PBC	  theory.	  	  It	  explains	  the	  patterns	  seen	  in	  the	  economic	  cycle	  surround	  Kirchner’s	  reelection,	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  accurately	  predicting	  the	  future.	  	  Though	  the	  political	  business	  cycle	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  effect	  in	  today’s	  Argentine	  economy,	  there	  might	  be	  other	  explanations	  for	  the	  economy’s	  trajectory.	  	  Kirchner’s	  policymaking	  is	  characteristic	  of	  traditional	  Peronist	  politics,	  and	  perhaps	  she	  is	  toeing	  the	  party	  line	  by	  utilizing	  social	  spending	  and	  similar	  policies	  to	  please	  her	  urban	  lower	  class	  constituency.	  	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  cycle	  of	  economic	  strife	  is	  simply	  characteristic	  of	  Argentina.	  	  Even	  Menem	  was	  a	  Peronist,	  and	  though	  his	  policies	  do	  not	  match	  up	  with	  traditional	  Peronist	  ideology,	  perhaps	  Peronism	  goes	  beyond	  political	  and	  economic	  ideology.	  	  Peronism	  has	  been	  synonymous	  with	  Argentina	  for	  decades,	  and	  its	  politicians	  often	  act	  of	  their	  own	  accord	  with	  regards	  to	  policy	  making.	  	  As	  previously	  stated,	  it	  is	  a	  widely	  accepted	  fact	  that	  an	  Argentine	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